

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

Washington Star

Wednesday,

January 28, 1976

Bush OK'd To Take CIA Helm

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

Although some of his supporters believe he doesn't really want the job, George Bush will take the oath of office this week as director of the CIA.

Bush has made it clear that despite the furor which has surrounded the spy agency for the past year, no major changes are needed in the way the CIA does its work.

The personable and ur-

bane former GOP national chairman may have to spend much of his time in the next few weeks getting to know the highly classified details of the agency President Ford picked him to head. He has no previous background in intelligence work.

Bush accepted the appointment, although it seems to contain more risks than benefits for his own career. The post already has cost Bush a shot at the Republican vice presidential nomination this year.

In a move that proved necessary to win the approval of the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, Ford removed Bush from consideration for a spot on the GOP ticket. Bush had made no secret of his interest in that job.

THERE IS SOME secrecy about what else the job may have cost Bush. The Armed Services Committee's report said the appointee will be required to dispose of within 30 days "securities of certain companies which are variously related to U.S. intelligence activities."

What are those firms? The committee didn't say and the CIA never talks about its relations with the business community.

The Senate yesterday confirmed, by a 63-27 vote, Bush's appointment to succeed William E. Colby. The White House said he probably would take office before the end of the week.

All four senators from Maryland and Virginia voted to confirm the nomination.

Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, R-Md., said he "sensed" that Bush had no real ambition to become the nation's chief spy. Mathias said he believed Bush took the job in "response to a presidential draft."

Critics of the Bush appointment have said that he scarcely will have time to learn the job in the next year. Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., predicted that if the next president is a Democrat, he certainly will ask Bush to resign as one of his first official acts next January.

But Mathias said that with the intelligence agency in turmoil, the most important thing now was to provide it with a permanent head.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JANUARY 31, 1976

Ford Promises Effort to Restore Confidence in C.I.A.

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

McLEAN, Va., Jan. 30—President Ford promised officials of the Central Intelligence Agency today that he would work to restore public confidence in the intelligence community without compromising its effectiveness or secrets.

"We cannot improve this agency by destroying it," the President declared at the ceremonial installation of George Bush as director of the C.I.A. For this part, Mr. Bush spoke of applying the lessons learned from the agency's excesses of the past, but he said he was determined to protect intelligence agents who risk their lives "only to have some people bent on destroying this agency expose their names." "This must stop," he asserted.

The remarks of the President and Mr. Bush, who is the agency's third director in three years, drew loud applause from 300 intelligence officials, members of Congress and the Cabinet and other guests assembled in an egg-shaped auditorium at the C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington.

But it was William E. Colby, the departing director, who stole the show. Mr. Colby, whose dismissal by the President terminated a 25-year career in the agency, was given two sustained, standing ovations by the audience—once before Mr. Ford arrived and again when the President thanked him for "dedicated service."

After the ceremony, Mr. Ford and Mr. Bush walked from the auditorium to the main entrance to the huge C.I.A. headquarters, building to greet several hundred agency employees. The workers turned moments later to cheer Mr. Colby as he strode from the building, entered an automobile and drove off into the late morning murk.

Mr. Ford, whose supporters succeeded yesterday in winning a 246-to-124 vote in the House of Representatives blocking the publication of classified information in the final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, sought at the C.I.A. headquarters to underline his view of the importance of intelligence activities and secrecy.

"The abuses of the past have more than adequately been described," the President said.

He expressed assurance that C.I.A. officials were as determined as he said he was to prevent recurrence of intelligence excesses. But he added: "We cannot improve this agency by destroying it. Let me assure you I have no intention of seeing this intelligence community dismantled and its operations paralyzed or effectively undermined."

He said that his long-awaited recommendations for reform of the intelligence community would try to strike a balance between the need for effective intelligence, including "necessary covert operations," and assurance that such activities would always be conducted legally.

The President said that the appointment of Mr. Bush "matches a good man with a good team" and that Mr. Bush would help to make the agency "an instrument of peace and an object of pride for all Americans."

Mr. Bush, the former United States liaison officer in Peking, had encountered some opposition to his nomination as agency chief because of his background in politics as a one-time House member from Texas and as chairman of the Republican National Committee.

'No Policy Bias'

In his remarks at today's ceremony, declared that "no politics, no policy bias will color the collective judgment of the C.I.A." under his direction.

"I will not turn my back on the past," Mr. Bush said. But he offered assurance to those he called "fellow employees" of the C.I.A. that, in seeking to restore trust in the agency, he would also be "determined to protect those things which must be kept secret."

He emphasized that he was intent on preventing disclosures of the identities of the "unselfish and patriotic" agents abroad who he said often served with "their lives on the line."

The agency chief in Greece, Richard S. Welch, was slain by unknown gunmen outside his home in Athens last Dec. 23, about a month after an Athens newspaper listed his name among C.I.A. officials serving in the country.

The outcome of the House vote blocking release of the intelligence committee's report was unclear today. The report was to be filed, as a secret document, with Edmund L. Henshaw Jr., the clerk of the House, who told reporters he

was not sure what to do with it.

Under the terms of the House decision, the report could be released once the President approved a censored version. But the committee chairman, Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk County, said he might not even file "a report on the C.I.A. in which the C.I.A. would do the final rewrite."

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Jan. 1976

C.I.A. Appreciation

To the Editor:

May I express my appreciation for the manner in which your journal wrote the Jan. 14 story "Paris Paper Lists 32 as U.S. Agents."

I am pleased that you did not repeat the names carried in the Paris publication. I agree with your judgment that the names themselves would have added nothing to the story, would have given worldwide circulation to what is otherwise local publication and would have increased the difficulties and dangers faced by Americans—either correctly or incorrectly said to be C.I.A. employees—working abroad in the service of our country.

W. E. COLBY
Director, C.I.A.

Washington, Jan. 14, 1976

Los Angeles Times

Wed., Jan. 28, 1976

PLANS ISLAND VACATION, BOOK ON SPYING

Ousted Colby 'Packs Up His Pencils'

BY RUDY ABRAMSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—As the U.S. Senate was voting Tuesday to make George Bush director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Egan Colby was, in the words of an associate, "packing up his pencils."

He conducted his last staff meeting and gave his last press interview.

Removing the last of his personal belongings from his spacious office atop the CIA headquarters building, the ousted chief of the country's intelligence establishment planned to return only once more—to shake hands with employees today, and to have a farewell dinner with members of the CIA's senior staff.

After more than 30 years, most of them as a spy, Colby then leaves the government. He expects, he said, to continue honoring his pledge of secrecy and he expects the government to pay him his pension. That is all.

In the weeks immediately ahead, he plans to vacation on an undisclosed island in the sun. Then he will start to work on a book on the intelligence business. After that, he will practice law for the first time since 1949 when he was an attorney briefly for the National Labor Relations Board.

President Ford fired Colby as director last November at the same time he ousted Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.

The Administration never gave an explicit reason for Colby's dismissal and, immediately after the White House announced his firing, Ford asked him to stay on until Bush could be confirmed.

In the interim, Colby has been a key figure in the Ford Administration's search for ways to reorganize the intelligence establishment and to quiet the controversy that has raged since the CIA became involved in the Watergate scandal.

According to officials involved in the Administration review of the intelligence system, Colby has played a leading role in spelling out the issues Ford should address and his possible courses of action.

Remarkably for a man who climbed to the top of his profession only to be unceremoniously dumped, Colby has gone on as though nothing had happened.

Whatever reforms the Ford Administration proposes to halt misconduct by the CIA, they will result to a significant degree from Colby's work after his dismissal was announced.

According to White House sources, the President has continued to praise Colby in private since he was dismissed and to rely upon his advice.

Monday, in an oval office ceremony kept secret until it was over, Ford presented Colby with the National Security Medal, noting that he had led the CIA in the most difficult period of its history.

After firing Colby and Schlesinger, and easing Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger out of the post of White House national security adviser, Ford described the shakeup as an effort to establish his own national security team.

Whenever the subject of his firing has come up, Colby generally has dismissed it by pointing to his commission on his office wall—indicating the CIA director serves at the pleasure of the President.

Aside from working on the Administration's intelligence reorganization plans, in recent weeks Colby has arranged to help Bush prepare to take over the CIA job.

At the same time, he has continued to defend the CIA in the press and to denounce the leaking of material from congressional investigations of agency misdeeds.

Colby's last public appearance as CIA director was Monday when he called a press conference to denounce the leak of a House committee's report and recommendations on CIA reform.

Though the recommendations of the committee were believed similar to those now under consideration by the White House, Colby appeared unusually upset by the leak.

There was a noticeable tremor in his voice as he denounced "outrageous statements designed to titillate and get a few headlines."

Until the Watergate disclosures, the congressional investigations of assassination plots and CIA domestic spying, on-the-record press conferences at the CIA were unheard of.

Lately, they have become ordinary with one disclosure after another of CIA mischief, going back to its early days.

Colby's last attempt to defend his agency was an unusual one for him. The old-time undercover man seldom known to publicly show irritation, amusement or any other emotion was clearly angry.

"It was not nervousness," said an official who has worked with him for years. "It was frustration and anger. When his voice starts to rise and quaver, you know he is Pod."

The issue of leaked reports on the CIA has been around long enough that the few reporters who showed up for Colby's last appearance had few questions.

And when the brief press conference ended, and the reporters and photographers drifted away, Colby walked from the auditorium back to his office through the rain.

PEOPLE

26 JANUARY 1976

CHATTER

Cold Comfort Though fired by President Ford last Halloween, CIA Director William Colby is just now, with his successor arriving, preparing to go back into the cold. "I'm going to do some speaking and try to write a book about 'the new intelligence,'" says Colby. "Then I plan to see if I can refurbish my law degree. I've had a lot of experience being a witness," says Colby wryly of the more than 70 times he testified in his embattled 25th and last year with the agency. "I don't know whether that translates into being an advocate, but we'll see."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1976

Colby, In Out of the Cold, Discusses

C.I.A.'s Problems

The following article was written by John M. Crewdson and is based on reporting by him and Nicholas M. Horrocks. Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3—One week after the Senate's confirmation of George Bush as Director of Central Intelligence ended William E. Colby's 25-year-long career as a spy, Mr. Colby relaxed in the sitting room of his modest suburban home and talked about "the elephant."

The temporarily unemployed private citizen used the term to describe the Central Intelligence Agency, which he headed for the last three years, but not in the same context as Senator Frank Church, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who previously likened the agency to a "rogue elephant" running wild beyond the control of the White House.

Rather, Mr. Colby said, the public confusion about the C.I.A. that has grown out of a year of investigations by Mr. Church's committee and others, and revelations by the new media reminded him of the Hindu fable about the six blind men who, each feeling a different part of an elephant, came to very different conclusions about its nature.

The retired 56-year-old intelligence chief told his interviewers that he wanted to keep both his secrecy agreement with the C.I.A. and "my pension," and he declined to answer for the record a number of questions about sensitive agency operations.

But Mr. Colby did agree to talk about some of the agency's current public difficulties which, he said, are as much a product of sensationalism and a lack of perspective by its critics as of the agency's own transgressions.

Mr. Colby, who was wearing a rumpled burgundy pullover and paused occasionally to sip coffee, reiterated his concern that recent news reports disclosing covert C.I.A. operations in Italy, Angola and elsewhere had provided foreign intelligence services with previously unknown details about the American agency's clandestine activities.

But he also said that, although such operations had dominated the newspaper headlines and television newscasts, they had typically accounted for only "about 5 percent" of the C.I.A.'s total expenditures.

It is the remainder of "the elephant," Mr. Colby said, that he hopes to portray in a book about the agency that he is planning to write.

Asked about the C.I.A.'s use of journalists to gather intelligence-topics that, along with covert operations, has created a furor in recent weeks, Mr. Colby rolled his eyes skyward for a moment, then replied emphatically that the C.I.A. had never "engaged in an effort to manipulate the American press."

The last five correspondents for major American news-gathering organizations who served the C.I.A. as clandestine agents were "phased out" beginning in late 1973, he said, and by the end of 1974 all had severed their relationships with the C.I.A. "At no time," Mr. Colby added, were any of the five, or their uncounted predecessors, told "what to write for an American journal."

He conceded, however, that, under the agency's current regulations part-time or freelance correspondents abroad who might at times sell articles to American publications were continuing in some cases to gather intelligence for the C.I.A. on the side.

Asked whether the agency had ever planted stories with foreign news organizations, Mr. Colby replied, "Oh, sure all the time." He also conceded the possibility that such bogus news accounts might have been picked up and reprinted by American newspapers, although he said he believed the effect of that on domestic opinion would have been marginal.

A General Reluctance

Mr. Colby cited a concern among journalists about the effect of such relationships on the integrity of their profession as indicative of a general reluctance on the part of other domestic groups, and even some Government agencies, to enter into close contacts with the C.I.A.

The State Department, he said, is reconsidering the advi-

sability of allowing C.I.A. officials to pose as diplomats assigned to American embassies abroad, and some private companies have withdrawn from arrangements in which C.I.A. men passed themselves off as corporate employees overseas.

In addition, Mr. Colby said, it is now more difficult to solicit interviews with businessmen and others returning from travels abroad about conditions in the areas of the world they had visited.

"Everybody agrees that we ought to collect intelligence," Mr. Colby said with a rueful smile. But he added that many persons and business concerns had lately adopted an attitude of "don't look at us" when approached by the C.I.A. with a request for assistance, and that, as a result, "We're missing information."

Distressed About Helms

Mr. Colby also expressed his distress about the possibility that Richard M. Helms, who headed the C.I.A. from 1966 until 1972, might be indicted by a Federal grand jury in connection with some of his activities as director of the agency.

One of the matters under investigation, Justice Department sources have said, is Mr. Helms' sworn assurance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the C.I.A. had not given financial support to opponents of the late Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, former President of Chile, and had not engaged in the surveillance of American citizens protesting against the Vietnam war.

The other subject of the Justice Department's concern involved Mr. Helms' authorization nearly five years ago of a C.I.A. conducted burglary of a photographic studio in a suburb of Washington.

Mr. Colby said today that, although the C.I.A. had provided money to some Chilean organizations prior to the 1970 Chilean elections, he believed that a "narrow construction" of the questions asked of Mr. Helms in that area precluded the possibility that the former C.I.A. director, who is the United States Ambassador to Iran, had perjured himself.

Domestic Surveillance

Mr. Colby also said he be-

lieved that Mr. Helms had answered the Senate committee correctly with respect to domestic surveillance by the C.I.A., since the agency's role in what has become known as Operation Chaos, a Federal investigation of anti-Vietnam war groups in the late 1960's and early 1970's, had been confined, with only a small number of unintended exceptions, to finding links between protesters and foreign governments.

The burglary of the photographic studio, Mr. Colby maintained, had been mandated by Mr. Helms's responsibility to protect the C.I.A. security, and not with any criminal intent. Mr. Colby speculated that no criminal charges could be sustained in that case or in the only other area of C.I.A. activities that remains under Federal investigation—the 20-year program of opening mail between the United States and Communist countries.

Mr. Colby, a lawyer who has not practiced since the early 1950's, when he joined the C.I.A., said he planned to return eventually to the law after gaining admission to the District of Columbia bar and taking a "crash course" in legal developments over the last 25 years.

But the book will come first, he said. The former C.I.A. director was seen a few days ago in a stationery store purchasing equipment for the temporary office he is building in the basement of his apparently unguarded home in Bethesda, Md., a Washington suburb.

Meanwhile, Mr. Colby seems like a man who is between trains, sitting at home on a snowy morning while his wife Barbara bustled around him. There is no Government car and driver any more, so he and Mrs. Colby debate over whether he should drive to a downtown luncheon engagement, whether he needs any cash, what time she can expect him home.

"And, oh," said Mrs. Colby, a bright, smiling woman, as her husband trotted down the stairs, "I need to ask him about shoe repair."

She paused and turned to a guests. "It's so strange to have him home," she said.

THE WASHINGTON STAR

22 January 1976

Spying for peace

William Colby, outgoing director of the CIA, told CBS: "The old idea used to be that intelligence would tell you a secret so that you would then be able to move the troops to the right of the field and defeat the enemy. Today . . . the most exciting prospect of intelligence is the elimination of wars because if you look back on most old wars, you find they started by a combination of ambition-misunderstanding. If we increase the understanding, we can convince the ambitious they can achieve more through peaceful means." He did not spell out the role of intelligence if your ox is being gored — which was probably wise.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
9 February 1976

PEOPLE OF THE WEEK®

CAN GEORGE BUSH SAVE THE CIA?

THE SWEARING-IN of George Bush as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on January 30 marked an end to a CIA era—but promised little letup in the Agency's troubles.

What came to an end was a decade of control of the CIA by "professionals."

Mr. Bush, 51, the ninth Director in the CIA's 28-year history, is a political figure, a former member of Congress from Texas and a one-time Republican National Chairman. He was considered as a vice-presidential choice by both Presidents Nixon and Ford.

That background drew some opposition to his confirmation, largely from Senate liberals. The January 27 vote to put him into the office was 64 to 27.

Now Mr. Bush is expected to play the key role in a reorganization of the CIA. Both Congress and the White House are working up plans to redefine its role in undercover work and bring its covert activities under closer scrutiny.

Leaks to press. Many officials, however, are concerned that widespread oversight of CIA operations by Congress would result in paralyzing the CIA's intelligence gathering.

The reason: Some of the CIA secrets that were revealed in closed sessions of congressional committees have been leaked to news media.

The latest example was a draft report prepared after a year-long study by a House investigating committee headed by Representative Otis Pike (Dem.), of New York. Release of the report was blocked by a House vote of 246-124 on January 29, but many of its details already had made their way into print.

One reported conclusion: Federal intelligence agencies operate in such fashion that they are "beyond the scrutiny" of Congress. Other allegations:

- Budget figures supplied Congress by intelligence agencies were far below the sums actually spent.

- The CIA violated a 1967 presidential directive banning it from giving financial assistance to schools.

Retiring CIA Director William E. Colby called a news conference to protest bitterly against the "obvious bursting of the dam protecting many of our secret operations and activities."

He explained: "We provided large amounts of information to this committee with the understanding that the secrets would be protected. . . . The committee seems neither able to keep secrets nor its agreement."

Mr. Colby called the report an "outrageous calumny," and asserted: "I believe it totally biased and a disservice to our nation, giving a thoroughly wrong impression of American intelligence. By selective use of the evidence provided, by innuendo and suggestive language, the committee implies that intelligence has deceptive budgets, has no accountability and has not complied with a direct order of the President."

"I deny these flatly."

Coming into speculation now is what effect Mr. Bush, as a seasoned politician, will have on the CIA's future.

Can he reorganize it without impairing its role as an intelligence-gathering organization? Will he try to "politicize" it to make it conform to the political needs of the White House?

The answer to the first question is still to be decided. To the second, most intelligence experts say "No," claiming that the professional staffs at CIA and other intelligence agencies fall into a pattern that cannot be bent to political ends—even if Mr. Bush wanted to turn in that direction.

Mr. Colby, who has taken the brunt of past misdeeds of the CIA, has set down what he thinks Congress should do in reforming the Agency.

In testimony on January 23, he said:

"Traditionally, intelligence is assumed to operate in total secrecy and outside the law. This is impossible under our Constitution and in our society. As a result, when CIA was established in 1947, a compromise was made under which broad, general statutes were drawn and carefully limited arrangements for congressional review were adopted. It was then believed necessary to sacrifice oversight for secrecy."

"Our society has changed, however, and a greater degree of oversight is now considered necessary. U.S. intelligence has already moved out of the atmosphere of total secrecy which previously characterized it. We who are in intelligence are well aware of the need to retain public confidence and congressional support if we are to continue to make our contribution to the safety of our country."

"Thus, from the earliest days of the current investigations, I have stressed my hope that they will develop better guidelines for our operations and stronger oversight, to insure that our activities do remain within the Constitution and the laws of our country. . . ."

"In 1947, we took a small step away from total secrecy by enacting general statutes and constructing careful oversight arrangements in the Congress. Proposals now under consideration would alter these arrangements to assure more detailed oversight."

"But it is essential that the pendulum not swing so far as to destroy the necessary secrecy of intelligence or destroy intelligence itself in the process."

Erosion of secrecy. The CIA was once so zealous of its secret mission that on roads bordering its Langley, Va., headquarters there were no signs pointing the way to "The CIA." Such signs have now been installed—and many more secrets of the CIA have been revealed, through leaks from Congressmen and their staffs, other Government agents and even the CIA itself.

Mr. Colby has acknowledged that he was the anonymous source of the first news story that exposed the fact that journalists were employed as intelligence gatherers for the CIA.

Ticklish dilemma. Mr. Bush, taking over as Director of the Agency, will come face to face with this problem, which is bound to be embarrassing to a former member of Congress.

Capitol Hill is certain to insist on knowing more and more about the covert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. But—

How can this insistence be reconciled with the reality that Congressmen and persons in other Government agencies have been careless in revealing these secrets to the mass media?

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 28 JANUARY 1976

A SALUTE TO WILLIAM E. COLBY

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 28, 1976

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the changing of the watch today at the Central Intelligence Agency marks the conclusion of an intelligence career that is best characterized as professional, dedicated, conscientious and uncommonly unselfish. Never in the nearly 30-year history of that beleaguered agency has there been a director who served under more trying circumstances than William Colby.

To fully appreciate Mr. Colby's performance, one must look back and recall the atmosphere surrounding his appointment in September, 1973. Just 1 month before the President of the United States—in an unprecedented move—had resigned amidst charges that, among other things, he had manipulated the CIA to serve sinister political ends. This turn of events forced the CIA into an unwanted limelight from which it has been unable to retreat.

In assuming the directorship of the CIA, William Colby knew what lay ahead as the furor created by the Watergate revelations provoked a public clamor for a catharsis of the intelligence community that could only be achieved through a long and painful congressional investigative process. Moreover, he may well have foreseen the possibility that the final chapter in such a scenario could include a call for his own removal.

We have watched the scenario unfold. As it was being played out, Mr. Colby spent more than half his time keeping this Congress apprised of the CIA's activities, both past and present. The record will show that his testimony was startlingly candid and proved most helpful to those in Congress who have been charged with the task of making recommendations for reform of the intelligence community. Somehow, he also managed to discharge his many other responsibilities in his dual role as head of the CIA and the intelligence community.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to express my appreciation for the talent, dedication and selfless public service of William Colby and wish him the very best in his future endeavors. I am most confident that history will adjudge him to have been the right man, for the right job, at the right time.

Helms Says CIA Job Was Lonely

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

Former CIA Director Richard Helms said today his 6½ years as the nation's top spy were lonely ones because Congress was unwilling to share in the responsibility.

Testifying before the Senate Government Operations Committee, Helms said that often congressmen assigned to supervise the CIA really didn't want to know what the agency was doing.

He said he questioned "how much certain senators wanted to participate in the dirty tricks that a secret service engages in."

Responding to friendly questions from the committee, which is attempting to draft legislation reforming congressional supervision of intelligence, Helms said that present law sometimes poses a conflict for the head of the CIA.

He said that in order to obey a statute requiring the director to protect intelligence sources and methods, it was sometimes necessary to break other laws.

He did not elaborate, but he could have been referring to the burglary of a Fairfax photo studio which was conducted with Helms' approval in an effort to find out if a former CIA employee was exposing the agency's secrets.

Administration sources have said that Helms is under investigation for that burglary and for possible perjury before congressional committees.

Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., who presided at the hearing, asked Helms what a CIA director should do if ordered by a president to commit an illegal act.

"His first duty is to argue it out with the president for whom he works," Helms said. But he added that if the director is unable to convince the president to change his mind, he has only two choices — go along or resign.

"And if he goes along, he may be left holding the bag and being pilloried in the press," Ribicoff remarked.

"That can happen," Helms replied dryly.

Reflecting on the 6½ years he headed the CIA until he was fired by former President Richard M. Nixon in January 1973, Helms said of congressional supervision, "There was not enough oversight."

Helms seen going in watch by Congress over CIA

By Peter C. Stuart
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

A new congressional watchdog for the American intelligence community appears a step nearer after endorsement by a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But Richard M. Helms, director of the embattled supersecret agency for 3½ years, sees a far different role for the proposed new congressional oversight committee than do reform-minded lawmakers: to enlist congressional "backing" for intelligence operations.

"There were many times when I would have liked to have been able to feel I had more backing . . . [when] I felt quite lonely," he told the Senate Government Operations Committee Tuesday (Jan. 27).

By bringing congressional overseers "in on the takeoff" of new intelligence activities, Mr. Helms explained, a permanent watchdog committee might spare the agencies having "the legs cut out from under you months later when you are in midstream."

This is roughly what has occurred in Angola after the Senate voted to suspend covert military aid to pro-Western factions there.

Mr. Helms, who left the CIA three years ago and now is ambassador to Iran, conceded that past oversight of his agency was "not enough."

THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN
7 JANUARY 1976

CIA Assassination Plots Not True, Says Director

Army Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, asserted in a speech in Oklahoma City Tuesday that no one was ever assassinated by a CIA agent or as the result of CIA plans.

Walters, speaking before the Rotary Club of Oklahoma City, charged that CIA critics have treated revelations of past discussions about proposed assassinations as if they were accepted CIA plans.

Attempts on the lives of foreign leaders were merely among things proposed to the CIA, but were never adopted, he said.

Walters dismissed the alleged assassination ideas as "ancient history" in terms of how much has happened on the international scene since.

Walters also defended the CIA's past experimentation in the area of chemical warfare.

He said the agency developed and stockpiled lethal toxins for experi-

mental purposes after some emigres from Communist countries were killed in Europe by strangers who brushed against them in crowded places.

The agency believed it important to determine what kind of poisons were used, how they were used and how Americans could be protected from such death attempts. He said this occurred more than 20 years ago.

Walters explained the CIA's experimentation with mind-altering drugs as a reaction to publicly televised confessions of such prominent Communist resisters as Cardinal Mindszenty.

He said agency officials were convinced that the resisters had been subjected to some form of chemical brainwashing because some of the same individuals had endured severe Nazi torture without breaking.

Walters said the recent criticism has hurt the CIA but the agency has managed to maintain its function.

"There were many times when I would have liked to have felt that I had more backing," he said. "There were times when I felt quite lonely — that I could not share more of my problems with them (members of

The much-enjoyed dismantling of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States through a purposeful public opinion campaign at the Eastern coast of the country has reached such a state as to have forced the President to take a public position. President Ford told a news magazine very clearly that there is no possibility for totally abandoning covert intelligence activities already because without them the discharge of foreign policy is not possible. Only realism, without the requisite general background and familiarity with world affairs and developments, can dispute this unpopular but always and completely defensible sentence. However, the American public continues to react as if intelligence activities which transcend the purely passive gathering of information, preferably from newspaper sources only - that is action operations designed to influence the course of affairs - were sinning against the spirit of American righteousness. In Europe, which is subjected to the covert activities of Communist intelligence services, the self-righteousness of this campaign can only cause dismay. President Ford needs his intelligence services for that gray zone between peace and war, so will each and everyone of his successors.

From N. C. Menon Hindustan Times Correspondent

NOV 15 1976

own making CIA is
new American hobby


The campaign of disinformation against the CIA is not confined to individual Congressmen who have been accused in some quarters of being loosely lipped on account of political opportunism. Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the whole affair is the 'organisation' called Counterspy, established by former CIA agent Philip Wheaton, who claims that there is within American society an "anti-democratic sentiment" that "uses the CIA as its shock troops" to defend our capitalist system and its geopolitical hegemony "round the world. With the stated objective of exposing such a system, Counterspy publicly identified Richard Welch, the chief of the CIA unit in Greece who was promptly murdered in Athens. Wheaton's next was

A recent letter in the London Daily Telegraph stated the problem there is in sorrow than anger. The letter said: "She (the United States) has no foreign policy any more, because Congress will not allow it. The intelligence arm, the CIA, is being gutted and rendered ineffective. The names of its staff are being changed so that they can't be traced. Her President and Congress are being hounded, and the country is not able to do anything but simply become a dumping ground for the world's surplus goods. Here, to be pulled down by the force of the world's surplus goods."

HARPER'S
January, 1976

THE FOURTH ESTATE

A GOOD WORD FOR THE CIA



Terry Mosher

Contrary to the melodrama now playing in the national press
by George Crile III

IN THE CURRENT welter of reporting about the CIA, the press once again displays its talent for the obvious. By and large the press has chosen to write a straightforward melodrama that amplifies the political passions of the moment and makes little attempt at subtlety, understanding, or critical reasoning. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than a comparison of the theatrical roles assigned to two CIA agents who recently came in from the cold to tell their stories. One of the stories has been accepted as revealed truth; the other has been all but ignored.

Consider first the experience of the man identified as the true prophet. Philip Agee had been a zealous middle-level CIA agent in Latin America for twelve years when, so he tells us, he discovered that a man he had caused to be arrested by Uruguayan officials was tortured. He had apparently been unaware of this Latin-American police tradition, and the incident triggered a convulsion in his thinking. He soon came to view the CIA as the chief force of evil in the world and resolved to write a book telling all. In his *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, Agee does indeed seem to tell all that he knows, including names of CIA officials and foreign leaders who cooperated with them.

The book appears clearly to violate the Espionage Act (which no doubt explains his self-imposed ex-

ile), and he makes no bones about his new loyalties. He wrote much of the book in Cuba, and he reports meeting regularly with Cuban intelligence and embassy officials in Paris and London. He describes himself as a socialist with aspirations, as he wrote in *Esquire*, to become a Communist and a revolutionary, and he praises the KGB as an organization perhaps repressive in Russia, but supporting the right causes and movements abroad.

His current efforts are devoted to destroying the CIA by exposing the identities of as many CIA agents abroad as he can. A traitor? A Russian or Cuban spy? Far from it. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" is Agee's motto, and in this era when informed opinion is focusing its concerns on internal threats, he is accepted as a crusader against evil. He is frequently interviewed on television, and many journalists turn to him as an invaluable and reliable source of information on the true nature of the CIA.

"Why did you decide to blow the whistle on the CIA?" he was asked in a lengthy interview that appeared in the August issue of *Playboy*. Agee: "I finally understood after 12 years with the agency, how much suffering it was causing, that millions of people all over the world had been killed or at least had their lives destroyed by the CIA and the institutions it supports. I just couldn't sit by and do nothing."

PLAYBOY: "Millions of people? Aren't you overstating the case?"

AGEE: "I wish I were."

While *Playboy* was running this interview, its sister publication, *Oui*, was running a short story of Agee's in which the United States is saved from a CIA putsch by a clean-limbed KGB hero.

JOURNALISTS ARE EMPLOYED to cast a cold eye on such passionately partisan sources. But the *Playboy* interviewer tells us of Agee's hotel room, which he describes as being "crowded with TV and newspaper reporters, publishers' representatives, leaders of citizens' groups, former intelligence officers, historians in search of CIA data."

Although Agee is the most conspicuous, he is only one of a number of CIA demonologists often accepted as straightforward muckrakers. The other two principal figures in this endeavor are John Marks and Victor Marchetti, two former intelligence officers who coauthored the best-seller *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*.

Together Agee, Marks, and Marchetti have considerably influenced the public perception of the CIA—through their books, TV and speaking appearances, and especially as sources for reporters. Here they sometimes rely on mutual corroboration.

Thus Agee quotes Marchetti in his *Playboy* interview as predicting "some revelations that will chill your spine, really grisly things. And some of them," he said, "may be connected with the assassinations of President Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and other well-known individuals, both at home and abroad."

There is no empirical reason to choose between the quality of Agee's unsupported assertions and those of CIA spokesmen, and yet today's reporters choose to lap up the cant of one and don't bother even to submit the other to skeptical questioning.

The explanation lies in the nature of the political drama now playing. Since it seeks catharsis, its actors are permitted to don terrible masks, and to ad lib lines more horrifying than those in the script—the more horrifying, the better: *Playboy* thus assigns Fred Brantman, codirector of the Indochina Resource Center and as zealous an antiwar, antimilitary and anti-CIA activist as can be found, to describe the CIA's secret

war in Laos. No longer is the journalist just an advocate: the advocate becomes the journalist and cites anonymous sources to document grisly stories of CIA agents carrying bags filled with Laotian ears or air-freighting a sawed-off human head as a practical joke. All of this is permitted—at times encouraged—in the morality play.

But if a man does not follow the approved script, perhaps even going so far as to question the validity of the stock figures in the touring repertory company, he finds himself consigned to oblivion. Consider in this regard the experience of David Atlee Phillips, the other CIA operative who recently emerged from the shadows of the Agency. Phillips was the CIA chief of covert operations for Latin America. In the midst of a successful career, he announced his retirement, explaining that he could no longer in good conscience sit back and watch the CIA assailed from all quarters without anyone presenting the Agency's case. He would, therefore, become the CIA's public defender.

Phillips began his career as a junior case officer in the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala. He had been in Lebanon the night before the U.S. Marines landed in 1958 and in Havana in 1959, when Batista fled Cuba; he was a high-ranking official at the time of the Bay of Pigs and played an even larger role in the Agency's massive effort during the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Finally, as CIA chief in the Western Hemisphere in 1973, he had been in charge of the last stage of the Agency's efforts to "destabilize" the Chilean government.

The press room at the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel in Washington was overflowing with reporters and TV camera crews for Phillips's first press conference last May, but they didn't quite know what questions to ask. Several sought assurances that Phillips was not undertaking an official propaganda mission; another asked him to describe all covert actions he had knowledge of. Everyone seemed disappointed that he didn't volunteer secrets embarrassing to the CIA.

Nonetheless, the story of Phillips's retirement was dutifully reported; he was asked to appear on several TV talk shows, and was given an opportunity to write an article for the Op Ed page of the *New York Times*. And then Phillips dropped from sight. Reporters stopped calling for interviews, and he wasn't asked to appear on television. He spent the summer organizing an association of retired CIA agents—460 of them—and held the group's first meeting in Washington in September. An account was run the next day on the obituary page of the *Washington Post*.

Phillips had assumed that, even if no college community wanted to hear a defense of the CIA, it might welcome the opportunity to subject one of the Agency's foremost covert operators to questioning or debate. He sent a brochure containing his offer to 586 colleges. After five months, during which time he received several invitations from patriotic clubs, VFW halls, and the like, not one college expressed an interest. Equally disturbing to Phillips as his swift assignment to oblivion was the skepticism of such reporters as did deal with him. His first experience of this occurred during ABC's account of Frank Sturgis.

STURGIS WAS ONE of the Watergate burglars and before that a Marine, gunrunner, soldier of fortune, and all-round adventurer. He was also something of a publicity hound who had a history of telling his stories to Jack Anderson. It was not remarkable that the *New York Daily News* should print a series of articles on his alleged past exploits: what was slightly more surprising was Sturgis's boast that he had been a CIA "triple agent," involved in such sinister plots as the assassination of foreign leaders and the overthrow of governments in Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Shortly after making these allegations, he was summoned before the Rockefeller Commission, to which he swore that he had never worked for the CIA. But then came ABC with its celebrated *Close-Up* documentary team to produce an hour special "to review the record of the Central Intelligence Agency."

Sturgis presented the documentarians with a dilemma: off camera he alluded to involvement in all sorts of CIA ventures, but on camera he wouldn't say that he had participated in CIA assassination plots; worse, he wouldn't even say that he had been a CIA agent. ABC solved the problem by saying it for him. ABC reporter David Schoumacher: "Frank Sturgis first came to our attention when he was arrested in the Watergate break-in. He first came to the CIA's attention many years before, one of Fidel Castro's trusted security men, but an agent working for the CIA. Did you, Frank, ever participate in any plots to kill Castro?" Sturgis: "Yes, I participated in several plots in Havana. Yes."

The CIA, learning of the interview a few days before the documentary's scheduled broadcast, asked ABC for an opportunity to disprove the Sturgis allegations. ABC, claiming satisfaction with its documentation, declined the offer. In the meantime, the *Close-Up* team had al-

crew to Phillips's first press conference, the idea being to include portions of his remarks in its CIA special. The camera crew was there when Phillips emphatically asserted that "Frank Sturgis never worked for the CIA for one minute." When the documentary was finally broadcast, Sturgis was identified without qualification as a former CIA agent, and his allegation served as the show's most dramatic indictment against the CIA.

THINGS WERE MUCH the same, though in a more exaggerated form, during the McCarthy era, and we are just now seeing some of its victims such as John Paton Davies and John Henry Faulk emerging at long last from the cloud that was cast over their lives in that particular melodrama. The object then was to rid the country of the supposed malignancy of presumed Communist infiltration. In today's drama, the new enemy is seen as the secret powers of government, and the CIA is the symbolic target. The first clear-cut victim of this crusade is Alexander Butterfield.

Butterfield is the man whose candor led to the discovery of the tapes, and, some would say, ultimately to the ruin of Richard Nixon. This no doubt stimulated the imagination of Col. Fletcher Prouty, the elaborator of one of the more baroque complexes of conspiracy currently to hand. Colonel Prouty, a former Air Force officer, served for a time as a liaison officer with the CIA. From that experience comes his book, *The Secret Team*, which endeavors to prove that the CIA runs the United States.

Colonel Prouty's theories attracted no serious attention until the wave of CIA revelations began to mount. Last July Prouty told Daniel Schorr of CBS and Ford Rowan of NBC that the CIA had placed a "contact officer" in the White House during the Nixon years, who was none other than Alexander Butterfield. And who had told Colonel Prouty? It was, he said, E. Howard Hunt.

Now, anyone who has followed Howard Hunt's statements throughout Watergate realizes that his record of veracity is questionable, and anyone who has read Colonel Prouty's book is aware that his theories of CIA influence are extreme. Nonetheless, NBC and CBS rushed accounts of the eerie disclosure onto the July 11 *Today* show and the *CBS Morning News*; soon the story was appearing throughout the country.

Neither network had called Butterfield or Hunt before rushing onto the air. Two days later, Butterfield went on CBS's *Sixty Minutes* and indignantly denied the allegation. How-

told any such story to Prouty, and Senator Church added that his committee had no evidence for it. By that time, however, Butterfield, CIA officer or not, had been stigmatized.

The Butterfield episode is the most glaring exercise in unchecked credulity to date in the press's CIA coverage, but the country's papers seem to launch minor flights of fancy virtually every week. Stories of CIA laser bugging devices painted onto the White House walls, of CIA officials having sat in on meetings with Oswald in which Kennedy's assassination was discussed, stories which surface for a day, register in readers' minds and then disappear from sight. Most anything that will add to the drama yet not deviate from the story line is admissible for a walk-on part.

But why is this necessary? Is it not gilding the lily to try to improve on the CIA's own venality—in its Mafia contracts to assassinate Castro, its machinations to poison Lumumba, its domestic spying, its drug testing, poison-caching, and who knows what else? There is mischief in all of this as well, for in escalating a legitimate controversy into political theater it becomes far less likely that a sensible course of action will be pursued to correct the abuses being investigated. What is emerging is a picture of the CIA as an almost supernatural power, able to work its will on the nation and the world. The obvious corrective to this perceived reality would be the liquidation of the beast. But what if the CIA has all along been an instrument and reflection of Presidential policy? The corrective might then only yield us a new monster with a different name—such as the Plumbers.

There is a final irony to the nature and style of the press-CIA confrontation that is taking place today. The James Bond heroes of the popular spy thrillers of the early 1960s captured the imagination of the American reading public as the romantic saviors of liberty in the world. Like the investigative journalist of today, the Bond-type spy operated alone and in secret, infiltrating powerful and sinister organizations with the willingness to use unsavory methods if necessary to subvert their evil intent. Now Bond has become the enemy, and the investigative journalist, his spiritual successor, is charged with the task of rooting the power-drunk spy out of his lair and exposing his corruption to the world.

It is worth recalling, as the press pursues this latest of its crusades, the fate of the CIA. It isn't in trouble today because of the ends it sought. Those were, more often than not, noble ones, such as making the world safe for democracy. It was, rather, the means it chose to use and for too long was allowed to use unchecked either by its political masters or by press inquiry. The press now adopts the same tone of uncompromising and embattled idealism with which young agents went into secret battle a generation ago. The world is not so simple and easy a place that any enterprise as self-righteous as the CIA or the American press will long be honest with itself. Christian and Moslem alike came to curse the Crusades. □

George Crile III, a contributing editor of Harper's, is at work on a book about the CIA, to be published in the spring by Harper's Magazine Press.

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. 23, 1976

Experts in Everything

Washington Post headline: "11 CIA Agents Passed Off as 'Journalists'". So what's new? Every day, "journalists," in the guise of "commentators" or in editorials disguised as "reporting" pass themselves off as expert statesmen, economists, sociologists, legislators, international spies, educators, budget directors, prosecuting attorneys, physicians, taxation strategists, lawyers, statisticians, military tacticians, environmentalists, politicians, criminologists, financiers, etc., etc., ad nauseam.

GEORGE B. TRAVIS

Washington

BALTIMORE SUN
3 Feb. 1976

House unit may alter CIA report

By MURIEL DOBBIN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A bipartisan effort was under way between the White House and Capitol Hill yesterday to revive at least a censored version of the moribund final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

According to congressional sources, the combination of administration attempts to negotiate a compromise and the reluctance of committee members to scrap the disputed report is likely to lead to the eventual release of an expurgated document.

The current controversy arose last week when the House of Representatives refused by a vote of more than 2 to 1 to allow the intelligence panel to release the final report on espionage inquiries until it had been approved by the White House.

The decision of the House hinged on an agreement between the intelligence committee and President Ford that he would authorize the publication of classified material loaned to it by the White House.

The committee insisted that agreement did not apply to the final report and voted to release the 338-page volume, most of which already had been leaked to the press. It was felt generally that the substantial leakage of sensitive information heavily influenced the House vote.

Representative Otis G. Pike (D., N.Y.), the chairman of the committee, yesterday still was adhering to his position that he would not issue any report

which had been "censored or sanitized" by the White House or Central Intelligence Agency.

"I feel we have wasted a lot of time," the chairman said with some bitterness. He noted that the situation was complicated further by the fact that there was no clarification of how many congressmen should see the report, of which 2,293 copies are now reposing in the office of the clerk of the House.

Mr. Pike's attitude was shared by committee members such as Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.) and Representative James P. Johnson (R., Colo.) as well as Searle Field, the staff counsel. But there were signs that a coalition was forming in the panel—which never has been noted for its harmony—to resuscitate, refurbish and release the disputed report.

White House sources indicated that soothing noises were being made by the administration which, having won its case

on the House floor, was suggesting that not more than 10 per cent of the report needed to be changed to obtain presidential approval.

Committee staff members corroborated that some negotiation was under way, and at least one congressman was taking the position that the report ought to be substantially rewritten in any case. According to a congressional aide, too much of the report was devoted to "titillating tales" and "simplistic conclusions" which were not sufficiently supported by evidence.

The problem is due to be debated today when the intelligence panel—which officially expired at midnight Saturday—holds a meeting to complete recommendations stemming from its inquiry into whether the American taxpayers were getting their money's worth from the intelligence community.

WASHINGTON POST
2 FEB 1976

Rowland Ewins and Robert Novak

Rules for Covert Action

A tough recommendation for scrupulous control—but not a ban—of all future covert CIA operations abroad by a special new presidential committee may now be long postponed by the madcap deadlock over release of the House Intelligence Committee's report.

The recommendation by the committee's staff, which would have been virtually certain of approval with minor changes, is now in suspended animation along with the controversial report itself. The House refused to make the report public for fear of damaging the national security. It overruled Democratic Rep. Otis Pike of New York, the committee's chairman, in an explosive and historic vote last week.

With the report at least temporarily blocked by the deadlock between Pike and the White House over whether it contains vital national secrets, some members are fearful that Pike will decide to jettison the panel's still-incomplete recommendations governing future conduct of American intelligence. These are designed to avoid repetitions of past abuses by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other units, without hobbling America's essential espionage operations.

Indeed, the textured tone and substance of the recommendations are at stark variance with the gaudy political battle over the committee's lengthy—and now suspended—report. They reflect a calm maturity quite unlike the querulous insistence of Pike and the committee majority to break faith with President Ford by including state secrets in the report. Their maturity also belies the climate of leaks and betrayals of confidence that have so injured the committee.

Section C of the draft staff report, under the title "covert action," sets pristine rules for governing the most controversial of all the manifold allegations of CIA wrongdoing—the so-called "department of dirty tricks" or covert operations.

It proscribes all "direct or indirect" assassination attempts, except in wartime, and makes stringent demands on the administration for all other operations:

Item: CIA Director George Bush must "notify the committee in writing" as to the detailed "nature, extent, purpose and costs" of any covert operation abroad, within 48 hours of its approval by the President.

Item: The President must certify in writing that the operation "is required to protect the national security."

Item: A proposed new congressional oversight committee to be established by the House must be given "duplicate originals" of the written recommendations on the operation by each administration official on a new subcommittee to be set up within the National Security Council.

That subcommittee, called the Permanent Foreign Operations Subcommittee, would replace the present "40 Committee" and, like the 40 Committee,

would be chaired by the President's NSC assistant (formerly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, now retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft). Further, the recommendations would forbid the NSC assistant from holding any other job in government, ruling out another two-hat monopoly such as Kissinger held for a year and a half as the President's national security assistant and Secretary of State at the same time.

Some administration officials are impressed with the still-secret staff proposals, and hope for their eventual approval by both the committee and the House despite the deadlock over the report. One reason: They try to come to grips with the slippery and constitutionally perplexing problem of preventing leaks of state secrets to the press and public.

The committee staff sets forth a specific

The rules "come to grips with the slippery and constitutionally perplexing problem of preventing leaks of state secrets."

method for hostile congressmen to go public with complaints against an intelligence operation—but threatens the member with formal censure by the House if he doesn't obey the rules.

Thus, if a member wants to reveal secret information he would need a vote of approval from the new oversight committee. Failing there, he would need a petition signed by one-fifth of the entire House to call a secret session of the House to vote on his appeal.

Further, in attempting to block the scandalous, sometimes disastrous leaks of intelligence information, the staff proposals recommend criminal sanctions for "unauthorized disclosure" of any information that might be used to identify an American intelligence agent. One such agent, the station chief in Athens, was assassinated late last year.

Considering the free-wheeling CIA of the past quarter century, operating until very recently with a succession of Congresses simply not interested in serious oversight, the sharing of operational power, with Congress alarmed some intelligence experts. Cooler heads in the Ford administration, however, are convinced that the kind of sharing proposed by the unpublished staff recommendations marks about the minimum limit of congressional intrusion, considering the unsavory political drama that has daily portrayed the CIA as devil incarnate for the past 13 months.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 Jan. 1976

HOUSE PREVENTS RELEASING REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE

Accedes to Wishes of Ford
and Agencies to Permit
Executive Censoring

KEY VOTE IS 246 TO 124

Pike Calls Action 'Complete
Travesty of Doctrine of
Separation of Powers'

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29—The House of Representatives acceded tonight to the wishes of President Ford and the intelligence agencies and voted to withhold the final report of its Select Committee on Intelligence until it had been censored by the executive branch.

The action, which was opposed by the House Democratic leadership, came on a vote of 246 to 124.

Representative Otis G. Pike, the chairman of the select committee, said that the vote had made "a complete travesty of the whole doctrine of separation of powers."

He said that the House "probably will not ever have a strong oversight committee now" and that his committee's work had been "entirely an exercise in futility."

After the vote, the Suffolk County Democrat told reporters, "I'm not quite as proud of being a member of the House of Representatives today as I was yesterday. I'm still proud, but not as proud."

A copy of the report was made available to The New York Times, which, earlier this week, published several articles based on it.

Mr. Pike said that virtually all information that was of importance "interest-wise or titillation-wise" had already been published.

Nonetheless, in the view of representatives on both sides of the issue, the vote tonight had major implications.

Those who wanted the full document to be published officially said that the vote provided indications on whether the House seriously intended to oversee the activities of intelligence agencies in the future and of whether the House was willing to leave to the executive branch all decisions on what should properly be kept secret.

WASHINGTON POST

4 FEB 1976

CIA Stops Sending Daily Report to Hill

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has dropped the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees from the exclusive readership that receives a top-secret publication called the National Intelligence Daily.

In taking the action in mid-January, the CIA effectively shut off Congress from access to the daily bulletin which CIA analysts prepare to brief top-level government officials on major political developments throughout the world.

The CIA action prompted a letter of protest from Foreign Relations Committee chairman Sen. John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.) and ranking minority member Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

The episode, which comes, ironically, at a time when Congress is seeking more oversight of the intelligence agencies, is apparently an outgrowth of what a Ford administration official condemned as "the present atmosphere of massive disclosures of classified information by Congress."

That wording was used by then-CIA Director William E. Colby in a letter Jan. 26 to Sparkman and Case explaining the basis for refusing them continued access to the National Intelligence Daily.

Colby's letter agreed with the claim of the two senators that no information coming from the Daily ever leaked from the committee. He went on, all concerned covert operations.

Then, the former director made his remark about the atmosphere of "massive disclosures" on Capitol Hill and said that he took "little comfort" in the distinction between leaks of analytical intelligence information and those concerned with covert operations.

Colby's letter, which bears no security classification but which is being kept private within the committee, advised Case and Sparkman that the Intelligence Daily often contained explicit references that identified explicit foreign intelligence sources.

In the event of any "inadvertent public references" to this information, he went on, "I could be hard put to explain (to the sources) . . . that their cooperation was being revealed to Congress."

Colby offered to supply, in place of the National Intelligence Daily, a document called the Intelligence Check List which he said included only information selected from drafts prepared

for the Daily. The former director's letter concluded with the perhaps unintentionally wry observation that "I gather from your letter that the committee finds our intelligence product useful."

The cutoff of the intelligence digest was the second unpublicized action by the CIA to deny the report, which resembles an offset tabloid newspaper, to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The last incident occurred in March, 1974, during the defeat of Phnom Penh government forces in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Communists).

In the course of an executive session briefing by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) mentioned an intelligence development from Thailand that he gleaned that morning from the daily digest. Kissinger's reaction, according to several committee sources, was one of exasperation that information he had just acquired from the report was already shared with Congress.

Almost immediately the Intelligence Daily was cut off and only resumed several weeks later after the written protest of senior Foreign Relations committee members.

Several congressional sources speculated that the current cutoff resulted from an inadvertent public mention in December by Sparkman of classified sums of money being provided through the CIA to factions fighting the Soviet-backed forces in the Angolan civil war.

Sparkman alluded to a \$3 million CIA reserve fund, which figured in covert financial assistance to the U.S.-favored Angolan force. A reporter, who presumably had been given a briefing of her own, corrected him and gave the precise figure of \$3.2 million. The incident occurred after a private senatorial briefing with Kissinger just before the Christmas recess in mid-December.

"What is curious about this entire episode," observed one Senate official, "is that with rare exception, none of the members were ever interested in reading the Daily."

The document was furnished each day by the CIA to the Foreign Relations Committee chief of staff Pat Holt for review by any member. It was returned to the agency each afternoon — more often than not, unread.

Full Release Urged

On the other hand, representatives who wanted to prevent immediate publication argued that there was a difference between an official document and one that had merely been reported on in newspapers. The House, they said, should not be party to the official publication of classified information and should not take steps that might endanger the national security.

Representatives Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois and Robert W. Giaimo of Connecticut, both Democratic members of the intelligence committee, gave impassioned speeches in favor of releasing the full document. Their speeches had all the more affect because both men are highly regarded by their colleagues and normally speak in an understated manner.

"If we are not a co-equal branch of this Government, if we are not equal to the President and the Supreme Court," Mr. Murphy asserted, "then let the President write this report, let the C.I.A. write this report, and we ought to fold our tents and go home."

Mr. Giaimo pointed his forefinger at Mr. Pike, who was sitting on the front row of the chamber, and declared, "If you think he is going to release anything that in his judgment would jeopardize the secrets of the United States, then you are wrong."

The White House and the intelligence agencies had "spread a smokescreen" about the secrets in the report, Mr. Giaimo said, and he asked his colleagues whether they placed their trust in Mr. Pike or the Central Intelligence Agency.

Pike Stand on Secrets

For his part, Mr. Pike conceded that the report contained classified information, but he said that there was "not the slightest question that we are giving away any dangerous secrets."

A secret, he said, was "some factor opinion to which some bureaucrat has applied a stamp."

Mr. Pike's opponents were equally emotional in their speeches.

Representative James H. Quillen, a Tennessee Republican, declared, "My country comes first, and I will not take any action to release classified information to anyone domestically or abroad."

The ranking Republican on the intelligence panel, Representative Robert McClory of Illinois, said that the President and the intelligence agencies had provided the committee with information with the understanding of confidentiality.

"We don't have to spread out in the record all the secret information, including information that might jeopardize the lives of individuals and jeopardize our activities overseas," Mr. McClory argued. He continued:

"What agency will provide us with data and documents if we can't be trusted."

It would be "unworthy of Congress," Mr. McClory said, to "translate leaks into official documents."

William E. Colby, the outgoing Director of Central Intelligence, urged the House earlier in the week not to publish the report on the ground that to do so would damage the nation's intelligence activities. Mr. Colby said that there was considerable potentially dangerous information in the report, although he never specified what it was.

Findings in Report

Among the findings in the report, according to accounts, published in The Times, were the following:

• The Navy conducted a program of intelligence gathering through submarines operating inside territorial waters of nine occasions these ships collided with other vessels.

• The operations and funds of the intelligence agencies were virtually unchecked, and the agencies used deceptive accounting methods.

• The extent of the United States involvement in the civil war in Angola had been understated by Mr. Colby.

• Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his wife had received personal gifts from the leader of Kurdish rebels, who had been supplied arms secretly by the C.I.A.

Normally publication of a committee report, even a sensitive one, is a routine matter that is not voted on by the full House. The intelligence report came before the House because of an unusual set of circumstances.

Mr. Pike's committee is scheduled to go out of existence Saturday.

Because the House is not in session tomorrow, Mr. Pike asked Tuesday for unanimous consent to publish the report Friday and an extension until Feb. 11 for publication of the committee's recommendations.

After a junior House member objected to the extension, Mr. Pike was forced to take his request to the Rules Committee.

Yesterday, apparently without the knowledge of the Democratic leaders, who normally control the operations of the Rules Committee, that committee adopted a resolution prohibiting publication of the report until it had been cleared by the President.

The Rules Committee's action forced the House vote tonight.

In another development today, Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced legislation that would create a permanent Senate committee to oversee the Government's intelligence activities.

The legislation would establish procedures to assure committee secrecy but specifies that the committee would be free to make public information if it found it was in the national interest to do so.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 4, 1976

Connally to Get Intelligence Post

By Rudy Abramson
Los Angeles Times

President Ford plans to name former Texas Governor Bill Connally as Deputy Secretary of John B. Connally to a key committee assignment in his upcoming reorganization of the U.S. intelligence system, informed sources said yesterday.

Sources in Washington and Texas said Connally is in line for appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which is expected to be strengthened and given greater responsibilities as part of the administration's overhaul of intelligence agencies.

Connally served on the board — made up of private citizens — until his resignation in 1974 after being indicted on federal bribery charges. He was acquitted of all the charges against him last April. After an investigation of illegal activities by the Central Intelligence Agency last year, a commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller recommended that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board be expanded and take on responsibility for CIA oversight.

The board was established by President Eisenhower in 1955 to advise him on national intelligence objectives. It was expanded by President Kennedy in 1961 to review the Bay of Pigs episode.

While the board, which has exerted little influence in recent years, is expected to be strengthened soon by President Ford, sources close to the administration's intelligence reform studies predicted Ford will appoint as the Rockefeller Commission had recommended.

According to these sources, Edward Bennett Williams, the nationally known Washington criminal lawyer, has also been under consideration for a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board post.

The President, according to White House spokesmen, will make known within the next two weeks his plans for reorganizing the national intelligence establishment. It is expected that most of his changes will require only an executive order, rather than new laws by Congress.

Connally, since his acquittal on the bribery charges, has resumed his interest in public affairs and has hinted that he harbors presidential aspirations.

With the help of a major Houston fund-raising affair, he has established a small organization called "Vital Issues" which he has used to maintain his involvement in public affairs.

Connally served as secretary of the navy in the Kennedy administration. Switching political alliances, he was Richard M. Nixon's treasury secretary, and by many accounts Nixon's first choice for Vice President after the forced resignation of Spiro T. Agnew in 1973.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
18 JANUARY 1976

HIGH ON THE AGENDA

—for this session will be legislation to tighten controls over the Central Intelligence Agency. Various investigations have uncovered abuses and transgressions that must be corrected.

However, the instances of illegal or dubious doings were relatively few and, as the probes showed, the agency has performed its essential functions diligently, imaginatively and effectively over the years.

Some fuzzy points in the CIA's charter ought to be more clearly defined, chain-of-command authority within the executive strengthened and Congress afforded wider scope for supervision.

But let's be sure that we don't wreck the CIA while trying to reform it. Excessive and inflexible restrictions would stifle initiative. And congressional monitoring might destroy the CIA if the lawmakers go around blabbing every detail of CIA operations that comes to their ears — as some have been doing.

We must not lose sight of the fact that this is still a very dangerous world in which a keen, energetic intelligence agency is vital to our national security. Render the CIA impotent, and the U.S. will be like a man blundering blindfolded through a minefield.

Crosby S. Noyes

Thursday, February 5, 1976

The Washington Star

Modest return to sanity signaled by House vote

Even if it amounts to closing the barn door after the horses are long gone, the decision of the House last week to block the release of the final report of its select committee on intelligence could mark the beginning of a return to sanity in the continuing struggle between the legislative and executive branches.

The vote of 246 to 124 by no means marks the end of the confrontation that traces its origins to the twin disasters of Vietnam and Watergate. But it was a decisive reaffirmation of the view that it is the President, and not the Congress, who has the responsibility for determining what matters relating to the national security may be made public.

With characteristic interperence, the committee chairman, Rep. Otis D. Pike, D-N.Y., takes it a good deal further. The House vote, he claims, makes "a complete travesty of the whole doctrine of separation of powers" and probably insures that the House "will never have a strong oversight committee now" to prevent the past abuses of the intelligence agencies.

Of course, it will do no such thing. There is nothing in the vote to prevent Chairman Pike's committee, or a

similar committee of the Senate, or, for that matter, the administration itself from making whatever legislative recommendations it wants to govern intelligence-gathering activities in the future.

What it may do, on the other hand, is to put an end to the diarrhea of sensitive classified material leaked from the Congress to the press — a process in which Chairman Pike's committee set something of a record.

What we are talking about here is an assault by a minority in Congress on the traditional governmental process of the United States. The assault is directed generally against the executive branch, with special emphasis on its most sensitive agencies, in this case, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence agencies.

The process is marvelously simple. In the aftermath of Watergate, every congressional committee asserts as its God-given right to delve into the most secret recesses of executive activity. And the executive — in its post-Watergate devotion to "openness" — readily complies, asking only that it should have the last say about what is made public.

This, of course, has been an entirely idle reservation. In the case of the intelligence investigations, everything of political importance was leaked to the press almost as soon as it was made known to the committees in secret session. Chairman Pike himself, in support of the publication of his final report, argued that "interest-wise, and titillation-wise" about 75 percent of the report has already been made public.

It is a formula not only designed for wrecking the intelligence operations of the government which to a large degree it has already done, but the process of government itself. The Watergate experience has left some members of Congress with the notion that secrecy in government is the root of all evil, that the people's "right to know" is absolute and no government has any business doing anything that is unfit to print in the New York Times.

The vote in the House last week marks at least a modest recoil from the mania for self-exposure that possessed us for many months now. Whether it will — or should — result in legislation to prevent the flagrant dissemination of classified material in the future, now open to discussion.

Revamping CIA:

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, Jan. 18, 1976

Easier Said Than Done

By Barry Rossiter

THE NEWEST Washington game concerns the problem of what to do with the Central Intelligence Agency. With the White House and two congressional committees planning reforms, the capital is afloat with proposals. The favorite formulas involve around executive control, congressional oversight—and organizational overhaul. And as is so often the case in the capital, reorganizing and improving are equated.

The most drastic proposition, and the simplest, is—"Abolish the CIA." Or put more dramatically, "Get rid of the CIA altogether, lock, stock and baglar's kit." The President can walk into its Langley headquarters and announce, "Boys, the jig is up. It's all over. Get out of here."

The weakest suggestions are cosmetic ones:

Rename it—say, into the Foreign Intelligence Agency. Discarding the tarnished initials will supposedly remove the tarnish and presumably provide an added psychological assurance that the agency will refrain from activities within the United States. But "FIA" is as good a target as "CIA" both at home and abroad in the unlikely event that it will replace the richly loaded "CIA" in the vocabulary of critics and propagandists. The shift might even be cited as just another example of "CIA deception."

If acronymic dexterity solves nothing, a "clean sweep of its present leadership" will give the agency nothing but a temporary face-lift. A new director, a new charter, a new and more effective Congressional oversight committee do not begin to solve the substantive problems raised in the current debates. Is the charter at fault—or the White House? Who is an ideal director—George Bush? To what extent can Congress supervise secret operations—even if it really wants to?

THOSE CRITICS who consider all or part of CIA's work essential to the national interest—and they are in the great majority—seek the solution in a reorganization of the agency. Their focus in my view is fixed on the right target, for the CIA is a unique organizational maverick in the world of Western intelligence—a large-scale roof organization lumping together several quite disparate sets of intelligence activities.

There are essentially five slices of the CIA pie that can be detached, discarded, or passed around to other agencies in Washington. Some are more tightly glued together than others.

—The overt collection of information from satellites, foreign radio broadcasts, foreign press and periodicals, private American citizens and companies. These are innocuous and non-controversial "services of common concern" to Washington's intelligence community.

—Intelligence research and analysis, ranging from current intelligence dailies to the composition of national estimates.

—Espionage and counterespionage, mainly through the use of secret agents.

—Covert political action operations.

—Paramilitary operations.

These five functions fall organizationally into two superficially neat segments: the open analytic mission in the directorates of Intelligence and Scientific-Technical; the secret operations mission in the Operations Directorate. These are, and have been since 1947, the "two sides of the house" in the agency.

The most obvious counsel would be to pull apart the two sides, most easily accomplished by taking secret operations out of CIA and confining the agency to its central function of providing overall intelligence estimates to the President. The CIA would then become the agency that, some observers note, the Congress thought it was setting up in 1947. In the process the "professors" would be separated from the "spies," the thinkers from the "thugs." Freed from the contamination of the dirty tricksters, the CIA would become a respectable braintrust, regain the public confidence and allay the fears of Congress.

What would be done with secret operations?

Either wipe them out ("give up the sport"), transfer them to another Washington agency, or break them off as an autonomous secret service.

These are tempting suggestions, but each offers practical problems in its execution.

To destroy the present intelligence service because "it has had its cover blown" (whatever that might mean) and to start a new, smaller, less obtrusive service from scratch can only result in the loss of hundreds of foreign agents, scores of effective working relationships with other intelligence services and five years on a new start. As this country learned in the late '40s, "It takes many years to develop a good spook-factory."

BE IT THE old service, or a new one, for whom would it work?

There are two logical alternatives: the secretary of state or the President. If the legislative authority

for all secret operations is given to the secretary of state, will the diplomats be any happier than the intelligence analysts in cohabiting with the secret operators? Will "State" replace "CIA" as the sinister arm of American diplomacy? Doesn't Dr. Kissinger have his hands full without taking on Washington's most controversial football?

Assigning secret operations to the White House makes more sense. The German and French services work directly out of the Executive's front office. They take their orders without an intermediary "director." They are his service and are allowed to operate under his executive privilege. Their scandals are his scandals. But their daily business is also his own.

Can it work in Washington? The problem is actually much more intricate than simply detaching the Operations Directorate and putting it somewhere outside the CIA. In the last 30 years it has become an integral and integrated part of the CIA's overall structure. Most of the Support Directorate is devoted to backing the secret operators, not only with its personnel, finance and logistics units but with the CIA's first-rate global communications network. The Scientific Directorate now does the research and development on the technical equipment used by the operators. If the operators and their administrative support structure were taken out of Langley headquarters, the "Agency" would barely fill its first two floors.

On bureaucratic balance—and bureaucratic facts cannot be shoved aside—there would be more sense in extracting the intelligence side of the house out of CIA and have it take along the modest support structure it would require. This service could sensibly be appended to the White House which it now serves as the top intelligence body in Washington reporting directly to the President through his National Security Adviser or acting as the intelligence arm of the National Security Council. It should not, as some have urged, be made subordinate to the secretary of state (or of defense) for its only claim to existence as an independent estimator unaffected by diplomatic policies or military budget interests. In this scenario the operations unit, undeceptively renamed the American Intelligence Service, could work under a chief directly responsible to the President.

These proposals are complicated enough, but less complicated than those for pulling apart the three slices of the CIA pie: the Operations Directorate. The strongest congressional and public pleas have been for a

separation of the espionage-counterespionage function from the covert action function. That there is a "dichotomy" between espionage and action operations, no one will deny. Again, the easiest solution is to wipe out covert action, but those who want to retain an American action capability and yet achieve a "proper division of labor" face an insoluble problem in separating political action operations from espionage.

Placing action operations in a separate agency has been tried before—from 1948 to 1952 in the Office of Policy Coordination. The result was confusion, duplication and insecurity. The intelligence and action operators would compete, as they did then, for the same foreign agents and for collaboration with the same foreign intelligence agencies. There would be two American "secret services" available for penetration of Soviet or Cuban intelligence. Above all, the strictly covert action operators would be compelled to fight continually for covert action projects just to stay in business—and at a time when the prejudice runs high against action projects.

As a matter of practical fact, there is no separate transferable "department" in the Operations Directorate that carries out political action operations. There are not two cadres of operations officers overseas—one for espionage, one for political action. The case-officer getting secret reports from a political leader is the same man who, on instruction, will discuss his agent's political plans and, on instruction, will pass funds to assist his career or his party's prospects. An agent, low-level or high-level, has but one case-officer, and all CIA business is transacted between the two—in Chile, Portugal or Zaire.

No clear line can be drawn between the collection of political intelligence and political action. The best informed agents are normally influential men in their own societies. Even an intelligence officer does not passively accept information supplied by an influential agent. Their conversations can range from local diplomatic issues to the Soviet-Chinese nexus. Through these contacts the intelligence agent is already an "agent of influence," for his bias is

inevitably pro-American. The shift from this function to that of an active political action agent becomes one of degree—from accepting advice to accepting money for carrying out an agreed course of action of mutual interest.

A knowledgeable intelligence operator, sure-footed on the local political scene, with a clear perception of "his man's" political ability and future prospects, is also the ideal contact for handling an action agent. Passing money can be kept as secret as receiving information.

With no political action apparatus to cut out or transfer, continuing to assign the action task to the intelligence operators has one added advantage. If there is to be no covert American action in the future, no one will be unemployed. If there will be, no extras are needed.

THE PARAMILITARY slice of CIA operations, on the other hand, is eminently detachable. Its personnel are specialists—parachute trainers, combat instructors, sabotage experts, etc.—having little to do with the handling of secret agents. Its logistics demand the creation of air proprietary companies, secret dumps, the hiring of foreign crews and large outdoor training sites. It involves the most extensive and expensive overhead of any covert operations—when it is the job of a civilian agency. It clearly belongs with the military.

Paramilitary operations have been the least productive instrument of American covert action. Communist-controlled terrain proved to be immune to resistance operations—in Poland, Albania, North Korea, northern China, North Vietnam. The support of the anti-Sukarno rebels in Indonesia and the invasion of Cuba ended in disaster. Even the "successful" invasion of Guatemala and the covert support of U.N. forces in the Congo had equivocal long-term benefits.

Now the President's covert arm has again been used to furnish arms to two factions fighting the Soviet-supported MPLA in Angola. No secret training, secret arms dumps, or black air flights involved—only the movement of materiel to and through

Zaire. Even discounting the practical and political issues the basic policy question recurs: was the use of the covert instrument essential or even desirable?

The personnel and equipment which have flowed into Luanda to support the MPLA were not ferried in under the auspices of the KGB, but by Soviet and Cuban ships and airplanes. Moscow openly supplied military aid to support a "national liberation movement" that has become a government recognized by many African states. There has been a straightforward military intervention by official invitation of a government in power—like the American interventions in Lebanon, South Vietnam, and Laos.

With Zaire always available as a convenient intermediary, why did we not respond in kind by the open delivery of arms to "our side?" It must have been perfectly clear to the President and his advisers that the large-scale delivery of equipment to Zaire-Angola could not be kept secret. Why then use CIA to "cover" an effort that was bound to become public? Why make "plausible denial" so ridiculous?

There can be only one explanation, as in Cuba and Laos. The President and the secretary of state were concerned that the Congress would not agree with their Angolan policy and would not supply the required funds. Secret funds provided the easy way out. The use of covert action, not to achieve a foreign purpose in secret, but to evade Congressional scrutiny, degrades the covert instrument into a domestic political tool.

Taking paramilitary operations out of the CIA and placing them where they belong—in the Department of Defense—would achieve two clear purposes. The Congress would be placed directly within the decision-making process for paramilitary as well as military operations abroad, and the burden of proof that covert rather than open action is required would rest with the President. The Operations Directorate would be reduced to a secret service—and it is about time the United States had one.

Rositzke, who retired from the CIA in 1970, now writes on intelligence and foreign policy.

Christian Science Monitor

28 Jan. 1976

CIA needed

It is hard for me to understand the irresponsible attacks which have recently been launched against the CIA. The American people, and a large group of other free world citizens, seem little aware of the fact that the United States is engaged in a perpetual state of warfare with the communist world.

The CIA and similar organizations are the only way in which the free world can combat the aggressive attacks which are propagated by communist organizations.

Only recourse available would be direct

intervention by conventional military forces, or allowing Moscow to have its way. Both are undesirable.

I suggest that those who are opposed to the CIA take into consideration the alternatives. Should the communists be allowed to run unchecked throughout the world?

Although the CIA may not be the most desirable organization, we must consider that which Patrick Henry once queried, "... is life so dear or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?"

Steven D. Swearingin

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1976

Text of Cablegram Sent by Moynihan to Kissinger and All American Embassies

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 27—Following is the text of a cablegram from Daniel P. Moynihan, the United States delegate to the United Nations, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and all American embassies.

Two bits of intelligence coming out of Africa suggest the time may be at hand to consider whether we have not made considerable progress this year toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums and in diplomatic encounters generally. Obviously, this was going to be difficult and it is by no means fully accomplished. At most we begin to see some signs of success. Not surprisingly, however, there is clear evidence that the department [State Department] is reluctant to recognize these signs, or at least slow to do so. This becomes a problem in itself, and is the subject of this brief essay.

[2] The problem arises because such success as we are having is the result of a tactic which the conventional wisdom in the department said would fail. Nor was this a perochial view. What the department thought was what most of the "experts" thought. It is what the journals thought. It was, to repeat, the convention wisdom. Any organization acquires an interest in its predictions and will protect them as long as possible. To protect them too long, however, usually leads to organizational failure, and it is this outcome that we would hope might be avoided.

[3] The tactic, initiated at this mission on the instructions of the President and the Secretary of State, has been to respond to attack by counterattack. A recent article in the London Times described us as having "taken the war to the enemy." This was generous, but perhaps not accurate. Save on a very few issues, such as the proposal of a world wide amnesty for political prisoners, our position at the United Nations had been re-active. From a distance it may have appeared confrontational, but this is simply because the United Nations General Assembly had become the setting of sustained, daily attacks on the United States, such that our counterattacks made it look like all hell was breaking loose up here.

Actually we had a normal session which looked abnormal only because we had got into the practice of responding in ways which otherwise would seem quite normal and predictable. I recall a luncheon, early in the fall at which I was asking the Yugoslav Ambassador to try to understand our concern that the Decolonization Committee (The Committee of 240, of which his country is a member, had seemed so determined to launch an insurgency in Puerto Rico by giving official observer status to the Puerto Rican Liberation Movement, which status had already been accorded by the "non-aligned" at their Lima meeting in August. In the most placatory way I suggested that he certainly would not like the United States to start supporting some Croatian liberation movement at the United Nations. Well he sure wouldn't. He turned purple and started raving about Fascism. In no time our embassy in Belgrade was being asked for an explanation of this outrageous provocation. Fortunately our Ambassador there was not about to be intimidated, but it is the fact that the Yugoslav reaction was, generally speaking, normal, while our willingness to put up with vastly greater provocations has been singular. Whatever the original sources of this policy, it came to be defended on the grounds that to do otherwise—to resist aggressive acts—would seem unfriendly and would lead to even greater aggression. Now clearly those involved would object to this characterization, and would argue that they only oppose needlessly provocative responses. But it is the experience of this mission that almost any response will be characterized as needlessly provocative. This does not take place at the highest levels of the department, but is endemic to the system. For months the rumor mills in Washington have ground out assertions of insinuations that the U.S. mission to the United Nations has been needlessly provocative and in consequence has lost crucial votes and has aroused yet new levels of hostility from various blocs of nations, especially the so-called "nonaligned."

[4] Just as clearly, the nations which have been objects of counterattack have sought to confirm this view. Thus in August 1975 the Secretary directed that notes be sent to a number of members of the Decolonization Committee to the U.N. stating that support for the Cuban resolution on Puerto Rico would be regarded

as an unfriendly act. Our previous pattern of non-response had become so fixed that some nations sensed that we had made a costly blunder. Copies of our note to the Government of Tanzania, chairman of the committee, were reproduced and distributed at the nonaligned conference at Lima as evidence of American perfidy for which compensation would have to be paid. The Government of Tanzania even sent copies to American Congressmen, who it was assumed would demand that our Government retract and make amends. In early January, a State Department officer sent a long memorandum to a New York Times reporter revealing the shocking news that the United States had begun the practice of withholding favors to nations which voted against us on important U.N. issues, and trying for a bit extra to those who supported us.

[5] All the more impressive, then, are recent reports which suggest that our new stance is having more or less the effect that was hoped for—that governments are beginning to think that anti-American postures at the U.N. and elsewhere are not without cost and that the cost has to be calculated.

[6] Item. In a report we are sending, we describe the reaction of the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for special political questions Abdulrahim Farah of Somalia, (protect), the highest African in the U.N. hierarchy, who was present at the O.A.U. summit at Addis Ababa. In accounting for the failure of the Soviets and others to obtain endorsement for the M.P.L.A. in Angola, Farah ascribed some of the success to the serious consideration, as he said it, given by Africans to V.O.A. reports that U.S. aid would be decreased to those countries in Africa not sympathetic to U.S. positions. The officer who met with Farah denied that there was any "black list," but Farah observed that whether it existed or not Africans were taking seriously and that it was, in his words, all to the good.

[7] Item. Embassy Khartoum reports that at the Afro-Arab symposium on liberation and development held there earlier this month, Tanzania told the conference that the United States had suspended \$28 million in aid because of Tanzania's unhelpful voting record at the last General Assembly. The Tanzanian representative urged the meeting to take a stand specifically condemning the U.S.

Government for such pressure tactics. The conference declined to do so.

[8] Item. In December the United States presented to the General Assembly a report on political prisoners in South Africa that was without precedent in its specificity and detail. We may be so bold as to suggest that in moving from the level of abstract generality to that of minute particulars in the discussion of human rights issues at the U.N., we may have introduced a change in methodology comparable to the appearance of the "Brandeis Brief" in American legal practice. This was not, however, the reaction of the General Assembly, where the delegates barely listened to Mr. Mitchell's statement. The Tanzanian delegation, which sits next to ours, never interrupted a noisy conference about some wholly unrelated matter. The chairman of the Apartheid Committee never ceased walking about the assembly chamber, talking to other delegates, whilst ours was speaking from the podium. Such was the reception given by the very same Africans who had appealed to us for years to make this kind of statement. We were not amused. Within 10 minutes I protested to the Tanzanian Ambassador (who was not himself present). A mission officer protested to the chairman of the Apartheid Committee. In the weeks that followed this mission did indeed verge on the needlessly provocative, as we missed no opportunity to suggest that the behavior of the General Assembly that day cast genuine doubt on the seriousness of the anti-apartheid positions most governments assume. Today, however, we learn that the Apartheid Committee has reproduced in one of its publications a condensed version of the Mitchell brief. This is the first occasion any of us here can recall any such favorable response to the United States by that committee.

[9] These are merely items. Much more important is the pattern of voting and decision making on major issues. Angola is such an issue. Clearly the pattern of American diplomacy has been complex in this matter, as it should be, and this mission probably does not even know about most of the measures we took to bring about the successful outcome at Addis Ababa. But we are clear that we took the issue head on here in New York. On Dec. 8, a routine anti-South Africa resolution passing the General Assembly was amended with a condemnation

of intervention in Angola. Zaire protested that South Africa was not the only foreign power intervening there. The United States followed by reading to the General Assembly the morning New York Times, recounting Soviet and Cuban involvement. European armies were back in Africa, we said, the recolonization of the continent had begun. The question was whether the General Assembly cared so little about this, that it would not even acknowledge what was happening. Now this provoked many delegations, no doubt, but debate on the resolution was immediately halted, and two days later the amendment was withdrawn.

[10]

There is nothing surprising about this. The nonaligned or the Group of 77, or whatever, are groups made up of extraordinarily disparate nations, with greatly disparate interests. Their recent bloc-like unity was artificial and was bound to break up. Maintaining solid ranks was simply too expensive for too many members, as witness the cost of saying nothing about the O.P.E.C. price increases which hurt

the developing nations far more than the developed ones. Just so Angola. It is no accident that save for Congo not a single African country anywhere near Angola has recognized the M.P.L.A. regime, with its Russian arms and Cuban Gurkhas. At the recent General Assembly, the nonaligned were similarly divided in the voting on the Sahara and on Timor.

[11]

To repeat, the surprising thing is that the department is having so much difficulty recognizing that our present policy, which is designed to help what comes naturally, is beginning to show some results. The department response on the Zionism vote at the last U.N.G.A. was a classic instance of refusing to acknowledge what was in truth a considerable success. Now the facts are these. In the crucial vote to postpone consideration of the resolution, 19 sub-Saharan nations either voted with us, or were absent or abstained. Twenty-one voted against us. Almost a perfect split. Leaving out those sub-Saharan nations with substantial Moslem populations, the vote becomes 18 for the U.S. posi-

tion, as against only 12 opposed. In other words, the United States had quite a success with these African nations. Yet from the day of the vote we have found ourselves talking to reporters who have been told in the State Department that because the U.S. delegation had been "needlessly provocative" crucial African votes had been lost. No one in the department has ever had the courtesy or courage to name a single such crucial vote. Whatever crucial means. The fact is we were never anywhere near winning on the Zionism issue. But in any event, the real phenomenon to explain is how we came to get so many votes. Not why we didn't get more. But those in the department who were convinced we would get none, are impervious to the evidence that this is not so. This mission does not expect such persons to change their minds. We do ask, however, that out of a decent respect for their profession they stop blabbing to the press what is not so.

[12]

More generally, and more importantly, it appears to this mission that there is

enough evidence in to make a general, interim assessment of our new posture at the United Nations. We like to think that we would be open to evidence of failure, and are aware that no one should accept our own assessment of success without some independent inquiry. But we do fear that there necessarily remains in the department a large faction which has an interest in our performance being judged to have failed. This faction has not hesitated to pass this assessment on to the press and to Congress, and to parts of the department that otherwise would have no view one way or the other. This is bad for the President's policy which the Secretary strives to carry out. At a time when we have so few allies, and so many of them are slipping into almost irreversible patterns of appeasement based on the assumption that American power is irreversibly declining, we would hope that some brave spirits in Washington and around the world would examine the evidence, and that if convinced that things have not gone that badly up here, take some foreign diplomat to lunch and tell him so.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 FEB 1976

House Group Votes to Abolish Intelligence Unit in Pentagon

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP)

—The House Intelligence Committee approved recommendations today to abolish the Pentagon's huge Defense Intelligence Agency and also to make it more difficult for Presidents to order, covert operations over the objections of the Central Intelligence Agency and certain other departments and agencies.

The committee rejected, 7 to 4, a proposal that they try to work out a compromise with President Ford on removing secret information from its final report.

In the Senate meanwhile, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, disclosed that he had learned four years ago of United States efforts to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba in the early 1960s.

The Senator, who said that the information had "dribbled down to me as an individual from somebody in the know," told reporters he had taken no action because "it was merely talk, and second if it was part of a Presidential plan, it wasn't my business to make it public."

The House committee approved by voice vote the recommendation to abolish the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Agency Called Deficient

A committee counsel, Jack Boos, said the staff had found that the agency had failed to coordinate military intelligence as it had been created to do; that its "intelligence product has been unsatisfactory," and that it had attempted to analyze some of the same subjects as the C.I.A., wasting money and doing an interior job.

The package of recommendations the committee approved are designed to make it harder for Presidents and their aides to order covert operations overseas over agency objections. It would require a six-member committee composed of top C.I.A. State and Pentagon officials to submit detailed written recommendations to the President for or against the proposed operations.

The six members of a proposed National Security Council subcommittee on foreign operations would be required to give the Presidential individual assessments of the benefits and prospects for success for a proposed covert operation and the risks if it failed or was publicly exposed. The six would include the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the C.I.A. director.

The committee's still unreleased report says that former

President Richard M. Nixon had directed the C.I.A. to supply weapons from Israel to Kurdish rebels in Iraq over the objections of the C.I.A., the State Department and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, according to committee sources.

The report says that Mr. Kissinger was instrumental in approving \$9.9 million for Italian political parties in 1972 despite a C.I.A. position that the money would do little good, sources have said.

Senator Goldwater's comments came in response to reporters' questions following his appearance before the Senate Government Operations Committee in which he opposed creation of a new Congressional Panel to monitor the C.I.A.

"The existing committees can and should be required to perform," Mr. Goldwater testified.

Afterwards the Senator said that during the early 1960s he and other members of Congress—"I don't even know how many or who"—had known about United States sabotage operations against Cuba and of its efforts to force a change in the Cuban Government. But, he added, he had not learned until the early 1970s that these efforts had included assassination plots.

He declined to name the person who had told him about the plots or to say whether the "somebody in the know" was another member of Congress or someone in the intelligence community.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 17, 1976



An eye on the spooks

How do you have secret agents who can't get away with murder?

The Central Intelligence Agency has done some brutal and stupid things in its time, and it has made some bad mistakes. But the current American heart-searching about its activities has gone beyond the uncovering of the unpleasant part. There is a more fundamental question that most people are dodging. Should covert activities in the pursuit of foreign policy have any role in a democratic society; and, if they should, how can they be controlled? This is not just an American problem, although it is the Americans who have dragged it into the light this time. The other western countries all have their own potentially embarrassing intelligence operations; and they all have a stake in what happens to the CIA (see page 73).

There are two sorts of covert activity. First, there is the sort that collects information: spies, electronic satellites, radio-monitoring ships and the rest. Second, there are the "special operations" that go further than just finding out. They are designed to make things happen—or not happen—in the country that is their target.

In recent years it is the second sort that has got most of the attention, and a large part of the intelligence agencies' resources. This is because technology has come to be the best way of gathering many sorts of information. Machines do it better than old-fashioned spies: communications interception and satellite reconnaissance have become the mainstays of the business. So the spook-shows have stolen the limelight. They range from misleading propaganda (a KGB speciality) and the financing of foreign political parties (a CIA favourite) through economic disruption, blackmail and assassinations to arranged rebellions and even wars.

Covert can be good

It sounds fearful, and a lot of it is. But not always. The assassination of Hitler in 1944, if it could have been brought off, would have been better than another year of world war. And covertness is not always worse than openness. Was that secretly planned attempt to assassinate Hitler somehow less proper than dropping a platoon of uniformed paratroops to do it? That is an extreme example, but it makes the point: a dirty job arranged in secrecy is sometimes justified.

There is a bad argument, and a good one, against covert operations. Some intelligent and honourable men believe that there should be no such thing as secrecy in the policies of a democracy. But democratic societies are more open in almost every respect than the totalitarian states that are often their adversaries. They start with that disadvantage: to dismantle one of their few remaining areas of secrecy would weaken them still further. Some sorts of covert activity are necessary for the non-communist countries, and that certainly includes the collection of intelligence about potential enemies.

The better argument against secrecy is that it increases the difficulty of keeping the intelligence agencies under control. The usual means of controlling the actions of government in a democracy are the press, parliament and public opinion (roughly in that order of effectiveness). But that will not work in the field of secret activities, because it means the end of secrecy; the murder of the CIA's Mr Welch in Athens is one consequence of that. But it is equally ineffectual to leave the supervision of covert operations to the same organisation that carries them out, and therefore has an interest in concealing the ones that go horribly wrong. Small committees of trusted

men, still or recently in the business, and more or less left to themselves, are no real check on what the spies and the spooks are up to.

So what is the answer? Not to give up the idea of secret operations altogether. The secret provision of American money to Italy's non-communist parties in the late 1940s, to balance Russia's financing of the Communists, is one example of the sort of covert action that most people would consider acceptable: it kept open the possibility of a free choice for Italians—including the possibility, in the 1970s, of a free vote for the Communists despite another proposed CIA distribution of dollars now. The CIA operation in Iran in 1953, which brought the Shah back to power and removed Mossadeq, is probably another example of a secret machination that most people would rather have happened than not. But in America, at any rate, secrecy is now close to lost. A new law requires the CIA to report its plans to a number of congressional committees, and in the present mood of Congress—see the fate of the project to put more American money into Italian politics—that is almost tantamount to having it printed in the papers. No wonder disaffected ex-secret-agents enthusiastically publish current agents' names.

Check them from outside

The problem is to provide a control machinery which will prevent the undesirable things happening without abandoning secrecy altogether. This control is best exercised by a supervising body, standing above the intelligence agencies themselves, which would have the power (a) to authorise—or reject—each proposed major operation and (b) to do a follow-up check on the permitted operations to see whether they achieved the results they were supposed to achieve.

This supervising body would report direct to the head of government—the president in America and France, the prime minister elsewhere—and would employ a small staff of security-cleared people. It would enforce a publicly enacted law which spelled out the limits of tolerable covert activities: no assassinations, for instance, except perhaps in time of war; maybe no activities abroad at all that were not legal at home (though this would severely hamper the effectiveness of the CIA and other agencies); fixed budgets, rather than open-ended ones, for specific projects. It could be subject to interrogation—in countries, such as the United States, which like to give their parliamentarians that sort of power—by a special committee of the legislature.

It would also help if information-gathering and "special operations" were separated from each other and carried out by two different organisations. The supervising body, and the president or prime minister to whom it reported, would then be in a position to use the information-gathering organisation to check the results of the work done by the other, more dubious, agency of surreptitious fixers. None of this would remove all possibility of error. But the thing about covert operators is that unlike doctors, who bury their mistakes, the secret agents love to bury their successes; it is the failures that are more easily brought into the open. If this sort of watchdog were created, democracies would have a better means of keeping control over their undercover men; and they would be less likely, out of pure exasperation, to chuck away the whole idea of covert operations.

WASHINGTON POST
17 JAN 1976

Panel Monitors CIA News 'Plants'

By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency maintains a top-secret coordinating committee with the State Department and the United States Information Agency to make certain key policymakers are not taken in by exaggerated or false news stories planted by the CIA's covert propaganda network, according to intelligence sources.

The propaganda coordinating committee meets only when a major CIA covert media project is about to break, and even then, according to intelligence sources, only a handful of officials are informed.

"If too many are told," one former agency official said recently, "the project may not remain secret. And with covert media projects, we are never certain the planted material will surface publicly. We only hope so."

Although the group provides warnings for high government officials, no similar protection exists for the American public—a situation that has drawn the attention of the House and Senate committees investigating the CIA's covert journalistic operation.

CIA Director William E. Colby told the House committee that any pickup of CIA-generated stories by American news organizations "is a purely incidental effect of the activity which is conducted abroad with its objective abroad and with its impact abroad."

According to former top CIA officials, it was just such an "incidental" effect of a covert propaganda operation that led to establishment of the coordinating committee.

In the early 1960s, these officials say, the agency was using its resources in the Far East to create irritations between the Soviet and Chinese governments.

At that time, the two Communist powers were beginning to have disagreements but were far from the open break that subsequently took place.

CIA-sponsored radio stations on Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia broadcast as though they were in China, and would attack a Russian leader. The broadcasts, monitored in Hong Kong, would be replayed in the unwitting world media.

On one occasion, a CIA agent was infiltrated into

China with a false story about the Chinese leadership. The story was picked up by Chinese fleeing the mainland and, according to a former CIA official, passed on as true when the refugees got to Hong Kong.

The story thereafter was carried by international news services and the USIA's Voice of America, which broadcast it round the world.

Only after CIA officials in Washington informed VOA that the story was false was machinery set up to keep key officials informed of the CIA's covert news operations.

"Contamination," the agency word for domestic U.S. distribution of its overseas propaganda efforts, has gone beyond pickup of news stories.

Another Far East covert operation involved reprinting entire issues of mainland Chinese newspapers after first removing one story and replacing it with a false one written by CIA employees. The real newspapers, held up in cooperating post offices, were then replaced by the doctored ones and mailed to subscribers all over the world.

At a recent Senate intelligence committee hearing, Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.) asked a former CIA official, David Phillips, if there were instances "where we have been the victims of our own (CIA) media efforts within this country."

"That has happened," Phillips replied.

In 1973, after CIA had reviewed its past use of journalists, an operational regulation was drafted to bar covert propaganda operations if they risked influencing American public opinion directly or indirectly. However, according to congressional sources who have read the regulation, it has loopholes that have permitted CIA-generated articles to continue to come into the United States.

After 1973, for example, the CIA continued to subsidize a London-based news feature service called Forum World Features. Begun in 1966, it supplied six articles a week to 150 newspapers in 50 countries, according to the feature service's 1974 promotional material.

The Washington Post and other U.S. newspapers, for example, received the weekly

service by mail with the understanding they would pay for anything that was used. Most of Forum's output consisted of legitimate articles but a few were on subjects the CIA wanted publicized. One such article distributed in 1974 was "KGB in the Middle East: What are the Soviet spies up to now?"

In April, 1975, Forum abruptly closed down after a London weekly disclosed its CIA connections.

A former top CIA official denied operations such as Forum World Features violated the 1973 regulation. "We try to concentrate on the behavior of (U.S.) enemies in the world," he said. "We're preventing suppression of truth . . . information that doesn't pay off. That's why CIA must do it."

The congressional committees are also concerned about the continued employment of American journalists by the CIA and the possibility they may be used to influence public opinion in this country.

Although the agency in 1973 said it discontinued the employment of full-time staff members of American news gathering organizations, CIA Director Colby told the House intelligence committee in November that about 30 part-time employees and American free-lance writers were still under contract.

Colby said they were used "primarily for intelligence gathering" and also to "make contacts with people that are difficult for an official of an embassy or American mission to get in touch with."

It was only on limited occasions, Colby said, that these journalists would be used for "planting stories," and then only in the foreign press.

The use of part-time American journalists creates a thorny problem for both the CIA and news gathering organizations.

Colby, for example, has consistently refused to tell the Associated Press and United Press International if any of their several hundred part-time reporters (called stringers) around the world also work for the agency.

Both organizations have a policy that forbids their employees from taking funds from an intelligence gathering agency but they are not sure it

is effective.

The UPI stringer in Quito, Ecuador, for example, who also writes for that city's leading newspaper, was listed in Philip Agee's "CIA Diary" as a person through whom in 1963 Agee, then a CIA agent, occasionally placed propaganda. In a telephone interview, the stringer confirmed he was mentioned in Agee's book but said Agee's "impression" of his role was wrong.

Rod Beaton, president of UPI, said he was unaware of Agee's allegation, and added that the stringer had a "good reputation" and that UPI would "have one of our key people check it out."

It is also possible that stringer-CIA agents are on the payrolls of major newspapers and television networks.

Agency officials were unhappy in 1973 when forced to give up connections with full-time journalists. During the 1950s and 1960s, many reporters undertook full or part-time CIA projects. In the Communist bloc countries and the Soviet Union particularly, journalists were almost the only agents the CIA had.

The CIA, according to one official, now does not want to close out the use of stringers. "How are we going to collect intelligence," he asked recently, "if you have a diminishing permissibility for cover?"

As for the argument that the CIA "involvement" compromises American news organizations, one former top agency official with experience overseas responded, "Don't tell me about the glory and purity of the press. I'm not impressed."


Last year, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) circulated among news media executives a prospective bill that would require government agencies, such as the CIA, to publish in the Federal Register the names of any journalists hired by contract. The aim was to halt the practice by exposure without barring reporters by law from taking such employment. To Kennedy's surprise, most executives who responded opposed the idea.

Colby also told the House committee that two of the CIA's former full-time journalist-agents carried on both roles with the approval of their employers.

GENERAL

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, January 13, 1976

'Third world' sees U.S. as foreign-aid**Scrooge****Official development assistance from industrialized countries as a percentage of GNP in 1975**

By David R. Francis

Kingston, Jamaica

The United States is fast acquiring a reputation among less developed countries for being stingy.

"I don't understand what has happened to the U.S.," commented a young Venezuelan economist. "It has been the most generous country in the world. It is now going bad, bad, bad."

Economic scene

He went on: "If the United States wants the world to be made in its image — adopt a free enterprise system — it is going to have to contribute to its development."

What bothered the Cambridge-educated official was the "negative" attitude of the United States in the Development Committee which met here last Friday. This body is formally known as the "joint ministerial committee of the boards of governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the transfer of real resources to developing countries." Its aim is to overview international development activities.

In that meeting, the U.S. representatives blocked practically any proposal for helping the poor countries that would cost money. For instance, they refused to commit the U.S. to an increase in real terms of funds for the International Development Association. The IDA is the wing of the World Bank which provides loans on soft terms to the poorest of the poor countries. It will run out of money in a couple of years.

To some degree Japan and West Germany shared the same U.S. toughness on limiting foreign aid. But they could let the U.S. lead the play without showing their own positions.

The U.S. has, as compared with most

rich countries, already become a skinflint in terms of its wealth (see accompanying table). The current administration shows little desire to change that. One Treasury representative was quoted as saying that the U.S. is currently granting too much foreign aid.

Instead, the U.S. tends to lecture the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that they should be giving more money to the non-oil producing poor countries. This is something like a rich miser telling the poor man down the street he should be more generous.

At present, the OPEC nations are loaning about 1.4 percent of the gross national product to the non-oil developing countries. Most of this money goes to fellow Muslim countries. (Similarly,

much of France's aid goes to former colonies.) Some of this OPEC money may be more military assistance than genuine aid. Nonetheless, the scale of OPEC aid is astonishing.

Mahjoob A. Hassanain, director of research for OPEC, reckons that OPEC members were making financial commitments to the poor countries at a \$21 billion annual rate in the first half of 1975. Actual disbursements of the 13 nations, he estimates, may be \$10 or \$11 billion, or several times that of the U.S.

Yet the GNP of the OPEC countries is only about one-twentieth of that of the industrial countries of the West. Aside from a few rich sheikhdoms, most OPEC countries remain basically poor despite their new oil riches.

Venezuela, for instance, has already committed \$2.5 billion in loans to less developed countries or the World Bank. In the U.S., the administration asked Congress for almost \$5 billion in aid this year.

Almost half of that sum is aimed at

Israel, including \$1.5 billion in military credits. The appropriations committees in Congress have usually trimmed the amount of aid asked by the administration. Though commitments take time to become disbursements, Venezuela could soon almost match the U.S. in

foreign aid.

There are some indications in Congress that the anti-foreign aid atmosphere is softening. The authorization committees of Congress have actually boosted and improved the foreign aid bills submitted by the Ford administration.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, February 2, 1976

While Soviet naval presence grows...

U.S. cutbacks in east Asia worry

By Guy Halverson
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Pentagon

Washington
Top Pentagon officials are concerned about long-range U.S. military strength in the western Pacific and east Asia.

Overall U.S. strength in the region has dropped 25,000 men in the past year to around 155,000 (at the beginning of 1976).

How long the United States will be able to maintain its network of fixed land bases throughout the region is considered uncertain, in the light of an unsettled political situation and a trend toward "neutrality" following Communist successes in Vietnam.

The U.S. carrier presence in east Asia, long the cornerstone of U.S. defensive strategy, has been quietly reduced. There is questioning within the Pentagon about the effectiveness of carriers, given new missile capabilities.

For its part, the Soviet Union has dramatically stepped up its naval presence throughout the Pacific during the past year, with a contingent of at least 100 submarines (close to a third of their attack force), Kresta II and Krivak-class destroyers, and other modern surface ships. The Soviets also use long-range Bear and Bison aircraft for patrol and reconnaissance.

Although the U.S. naval force in Asia

remains formidable — including at least 22 cruiser-destroyers, 500 aircraft, and a large attack-submarine force — it is the reduction in carrier — to two from three — that most bothers some analysts here. Of the two carriers, remaining, the Midway and Oriskany, the latter is aging and has been scheduled for decommissioning this year.

The U.S. attack-submarine fleet, moreover, is not believed to be as large as either the Soviet or Chinese force now operating in Asian waters.

Primarily because of the general American decline in Asia — and the upsurge of Soviet activity — U.S. defense planners are putting increased pressure on Japan to step up its defense-force levels, while cautiously optimistic about increased Chinese production of naval vessels.

In addition, Pentagon planners are mulling the possibility of moving toward mobile offshore naval installations in Asia in the 1980s.

These "floating bases" could in effect take the place of fixed land bases that might prove vulnerable to local political turmoil.

While current U.S. bases in the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan are considered absolutely vital, the United States is also interested in future naval rights in Singapore, after the final British pullout later this year.

WASHINGTON POST
26 JAN 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Brezhnev's Need For a SALT Agreement

Although U.S. negotiators always seem the desperately anxious suitors, top Kremlinologists here believe Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev needs political help at home from a new arms limitation agreement far more than does President Ford.

The U.S. drive for agreement is based not only on defense budget pressures but also on Mr. Ford's quest for election-year accomplishment and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's desire to climax his detente diplomacy. But these factors, Kremlinologists believe, are dwarfed by Russian needs: economic crisis in the

Soviet Union that may reduce present massive defense spending.

Soviet hunger for SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) puts an ironic cast on last week's talks in Moscow. Hard-liners in Congress and the Pentagon believe Dr. Kissinger arrived there with an official position that gave away too much and fear he went further in bargaining.

Brezhnev goes before the Communist Party Congress Feb. 24 with the worst record of economic achievement since the early days of World War II, when German invaders ravaged the country. The five-

year plan that has not met principal economic goals. The shortfall has been worst in grain production, forcing the Kremlin into the world grain market for unprecedented purchases from the capitalist West.

With the price of gold now \$50 an ounce below the spectacular high of a year ago, the Soviet government is loath to raise money today by substantial sales from its hoard of gold.

That means insufficient feed grains for promised fattening of beef cattle and other meat animals. Likewise, output of consumer goods is lagging far behind original schedules. Result: The long promised availability of consumer goods has once again proved illusory.

Thus, some Kremlinologists here are convinced the economic shortfall is about to trigger a major internal battle over the level of Soviet defense spending in the next five-year plan. Their conclusion: defense spending will be forced downward simply

because financing at present levels will not be available, with money drying up because of foreign purchase of grain.

Perhaps more damaging to Brezhnev's reputation high in the Communist Party are shortfalls in his foreign policy. He never has been able to convene a Europe-wide parley of Communist parties; party leaders in Yugoslavia, France,

Italy and possibly other countries have refused to toe the Brezhnev mark.

Similarly, the European Security Conference finally held in Helsinki last summer has fallen far short of being the significant Soviet triumph it was touted to be. Nor has Brezhnev made progress with the West—particularly the U.S.—in thinning out European force levels.

Believing, therefore, that Soviet military spending will have to go down anyway, hard-liners in Washington question why the President and his Secretary of State have pushed so insistently for a new SALT agreement.

The answer lies in Mr. Ford's political needs and Dr. Kissinger's desires to complete his diplomatic grand design.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 25, 1976

Arms Cheating May Be A Matter of Interpretation

By JOHN W. FINNEY

WASHINGTON — Between initial ambiguities in draftsmanship, overselling by the Administration and political rivalries, the initial euphoria over the 1972 strategic arms agreements has disintegrated into a debate over whether the Soviet Union is cheating the United States.

It is in great contrast to the heady atmosphere that prevailed less than four years ago in Moscow, when the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a treaty sharply limiting antiballistic missile defense systems and an interim, five-year agreement limiting the offensive missiles each side could possess. The doubts followed Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to Moscow last week as he sought to complete a new longer-term strategic arms agreement with apparently limited success.

In 1972, the emphasis was upon how the two sides finally had slowed the atomic arms race and should now be able to make reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Almost as importantly, the two sides had reached their agreements by getting around the previous obstacle on inspections by deciding that it would be sufficient to rely upon national means of verification.

Now the preoccupation, at least politically in the United States, is whether the Soviet Union can be trusted to comply with the 1972 agreements and also in the future agreement the two sides fitfully have been trying to reach to plan a new ceiling on offensive strategic weapons.

For the last year, particularly from the political right, charges have been made that the Soviet Union has been violating the 1972 agreements. They were started by the former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, and Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations, neither of whom were great fans of Mr. Kissinger who negotiated the agreements. They have been picked up by Senator Henry M. Jackson, who has Presidential ambitions, and there are indications they will become a détente-related issue in the political campaign.

The charges have produced indignation in Moscow. The Kremlin, in an article in Pravda, denied that it had violated the agreements and suggested it had doubts about American compliance.

The Soviet Union has been accused of violating the spirit if not the letter of the agreements by deploying a new class of heavy intercontinental missiles known as SS-19's, by testing anti-aircraft radars in an antiballistic missile manner, by constructing new silos which could be used by intercontinental missiles, by covering some submarine construction pens and missile test areas, and by constructing a new antiballistic missile radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

It has been as difficult for the critics to prove the charges as it has been for the Administration, caught up in self-imposed secrecy, to disprove them. The difficulty in establishing a case one way or the other is that the agreements, in their technical complexity

and corresponding ambiguity in terms, lend themselves to competing interpretations. President Ford said last June that the Soviet Union has "not violated the [Strategic Arms Limitations] Agreement, nor used any loopholes." Mr. Ford may have overstated his case; at least, he left himself open to the countercharge by Admiral Zumwalt, seconded by Senator Jackson, that Mr. Kissinger had drafted agreements with enough loopholes "to drive a truck through."

In some cases, the evidence of Soviet violations is ambiguous. For example, intelligence agencies recently raised the possibility that the Soviet Union was using laser beams to blind the early detection satellites of the United States. It turned out that the satellites were picking up not laser beams but the flares of gas pipelines that had exploded.

Mostly, however, the difficulty lies in the ambiguity of the terms of the agreement, some of which were hastily worked out by Mr. Kissinger in the final, frantic hours of negotiations. For example, the testing of the anti-aircraft radars, which is generally acknowledged within the Administration came close to a technical violation. The agreement specifies that the radars can not be tested in "an antiballistic missile mode," a provision designed to prevent the upgrading of anti-aircraft defenses into missile defenses. But the agreement also permits radars to be tested for range instrumentation purposes. Naturally, the Soviets contended they were just calibrating and testing the radars. However, once the United States raised the issue in the Standing Consultative Committee, created to consider violations, the testing stopped.

Some of the ambiguities have apparently been cleared up in last week's talks. That apparently applies, for example, to the SS-19 missiles, which had been a particularly disturbing development under the interim agreement. In case of the SS-19's, Mr. Kissinger had not been able to get Soviet agreement on the terms and relied upon unilateral interpretations by the United States of what the agreements meant. The initial accord specified that neither side would convert light missiles into heavy missiles under the numerical limitations, but they were unable to agree on what was light and what was heavy. As a result, the United States declared unilaterally that it would regard any missile "significantly" heavier than the largest light missile then in operation in the Soviet Union, namely the SS-11, to be a heavy missile.

It is generally agreed within the Administration that the Soviet SS-19 missile is about 50 percent heavier than the SS-11, which meant that the Soviet Union was not complying with the unilateral interpretation of the United States. But since that interpretation was unilateral, it could still be contended that the Soviet Union was not violating the agreement. The matter was apparently resolved last week with the SS-19's being substituted for the SS-11's.

During Congressional hearings on the agreements, Mr. Kissinger conveyed the impression that Soviet noncompliance with the unilateral interpretations would, or could be construed as Soviet violations of

the agreements. As he retreated from that position, he exposed himself to the charge by Admiral Zumwalt and Senator Jackson that the Soviet Union violated the agreements as they were explained to Congress and the United States acquiesced in the Soviet circumvention.

More is at stake than the personal credibility of Mr. Kissinger, who at times seemed to have been driven into being an apologist for Soviet actions. Ultimately what is at stake is public credibility in future strategic arms agreements and with the whole

process of détente.

There is reason to believe that one motive of those raising the charges is to obstruct future agreements, including the one Mr. Kissinger now seeks, and détente. If the public comes to believe that the Soviet Union is violating the 1972 agreements, then it will be that much more difficult to sell Congress on any new agreement.

John W. Finney reports on military affairs for The New York Times.

WASHINGTON POST
5 FEB 1976

Joseph Kraft

The Ford Stamp On Arms Control

While Henry Kissinger was in Moscow last month, President Ford convoked at the White House a secret—and I believe until now unpublicized—meeting of the National Security Council. At that meeting there were raised by Pentagon representatives a host of questions about arms control at variance with the line being followed by Dr. Kissinger in Moscow.

The immediate upshot was that the Moscow talks were adjourned pending further discussion of the U.S. position in Washington. But underlying the whole episode is a fight which President Ford has yet to resolve between Dr. Kissinger, who desperately wants an accord, and the military chiefs, who have their doubts.

Until recently arms control negotiations in the Ford administration had been largely a two-man show. Secretary of State Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger blocked out various alternatives and compromises. These were presented to the President who made his choices—sometimes, judging by one discussion I had with Mr. Ford on SALT, without detailed knowledge.

That system did not work badly at all. For example, before the Vladivostok meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in December 1974, Mr. Ford selected a Schlesinger position and elicited from the Russians a concession Dr. Kissinger had long maintained would never be granted.

Specifically, the Russians abandoned the view that they needed more nuclear

weapons than the United States because of the threat from China and the support the United States received from French and British nuclear forces. The Russians agreed that each superpower would have "equal aggregates" of strategic nuclear weapons and that the British and French forces would not be counted. The limit was set at 2,400 launchers apiece. Each side would be allowed to equip 1,320 launchers with missiles bearing multiple warheads, or MIRVs.

Subsequent negotiations have involved the details left ambiguous at Vladivostok. One of the thorniest problems was over two weapon systems not covered by the Vladivostok agreement—the American cruise missile, a pilotless drone which has, thanks to new technology, the capacity to fly long distances with great accuracy; and Russia's Backfire bomber, a plane originally designed for medium-range operations but capable in certain cases of delivering bombs on the United States.

The Russians, who have cruise missiles with a 375-mile range on submarines, wanted that range applied to all cruise missiles. American military men demanded the right to have longer-range cruise missiles and insisted that the Backfire be covered in the agreement.

In his Moscow talks with Mr. Brezhnev last month, Dr. Kissinger came up with what he thought were answers to both problems. The Russians agreed that the cruise missiles fired from aircraft could have a range of 1,500 miles—thus making

it possible for the United States to put such missiles on bombers and hit central Russia from its periphery. The Russians insisted, however, that any bomber armed with 10 or more cruise missiles should be accounted against the MIRV total of 1,320. Since the United States has already plans for something like 1,280 multiple-headed nuclear weapons, that would in effect discourage any big development of the cruise missile.

With respect to the Backfire bomber, the Russians agreed to deploy it in a way inconsistent with use against the United States. They also agreed to lower the number of total launchers from 2,400 to between 2,100 and 2,200. Since they already have some 2,400 launchers, the lower total would be another disincentive for building Backfire into an intercontinental weapon.

Dr. Kissinger was apparently elated by these understandings. But at the NSC meeting the President called, serious questions were raised by Pentagon officials about whether the constraints against Backfire were insufficient and how one could verify Soviet compliance with the limits on cruise missiles.

In these chaotic conditions it was decided that Dr. Kissinger should come back for consultation before proceeding further with the Russians. That decision is now being seen as a victory for the hawks and a setback for Dr. Kissinger.

But good arguments can be made against all the questions raised by the hawks. The important thing is that these serious questions be debated fully before the President without any end runs or sleight-of-hand tricks. For my part, I am confident that Mr. Ford, once he fully understands the issues, will move this year to conclude an arms agreement with Moscow and present it to the Congress and the American people as another step toward making the world a safer place.

Field Editor

WASHINGTON POST
27 JAN 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Troubles Of the Arms Merchant

A tongue-lashing applied by a bumptious Iranian general to a startled U.S. Cabinet member over lunch Jan. 19 in a private Pentagon dining room reveals the woes

and suggests the folly of this country's present posture as the world's greatest arms merchant.

Gen. Hassan Toufanian, Iran's vice minister of war for armament, was hop-

ping mad over the rising cost of U.S. weapons and the low production in Iran by the international consortium of oil companies. In rough language, he told Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to lower arms prices and pressure American members of the consortium to step up oil production, thereby generating more dollars to buy weapons. Otherwise, Toufanian warned, Iran might seek new arms suppliers and new allies.

Attempting to bully Rumsfeld, one of Washington's most cold-blooded fighters, was a colossal tactical error. While contenting himself at lunch with a

cool rejection of the Iranian demands, Rumsfeld may now align himself with the minority of administration officials long skeptical about Uncle Sam as arms merchant for the Shah of Iran.

What also remains to be seen is whether Rumsfeld might join Treasury Secretary William Simon in renewing an old policy dispute inside the Ford administration. Simon still wants confrontation against the international oil cartel (OPEC) in general and Iran in particular to break world oil prices. Until now, President Ford has rejected Simon's advice and accepted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's policy of aiding OPEC members—including heavy arms aid for Iran.

That aid can be traced to President Richard M. Nixon's travels in May 1972 at the peak of his power and popularity. Arriving in Teheran May 30, after signing the SALT agreement in Moscow, Nixon promised heavy U.S. arms sales to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah, intent on countering Soviet power, thereupon escalated his weapons purchases. From \$113 million in 1970 and \$524 million in 1972 (the year of Nixon's Teheran visit), Iranian orders of U.S. arms climbed to \$2.1 billion in 1973, \$3.9 billion in 1974 and \$2.6 billion in 1975.

These purchases certainly did not trigger the Shah's big push inside OPEC for high oil prices; basically, he needed

dollars for ambitious internal improvements. Nevertheless, Gen. Toufanian's demands at the Pentagon last week suggest a vicious cycle between oil and weapons.

Disastrous worldwide inflation, caused mainly by expensive oil, creates the rise in U.S. arms costs which aggravated the Iranian general. But the depressing effect of OPEC prices has reduced Western oil demand, leading to Iran's slack production, also complained about by Toufanian. Faced with dollar needs to finance his weapon orders, Iran cannot even contemplate lowering OPEC prices to coincide with reduced demand.

Actually, heavier arms sales were opposed unsuccessfully upon Nixon's return from Teheran in 1972 by his then-Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Improvements in the U.S. balance of payments, Laird argued, would be outweighed by the threat to world peace by fueling the Mideast arms race. His argument, both at the Pentagon and since leaving it: The U.S. should try to negotiate limits on the arms trade rather than becoming its leading practitioner.

The successful State Department riposte cited not only the balance of payments but the likelihood that the Shah would find other suppliers—probably Great Britain and France—if turned down by Washington. But military experts here

contend no Western European nation can match the United States in quality, amounts and technical assistance. For Iran, they say, it boils down to U.S. arms or nothing.

These same experts, moreover, believe the Shah's lavish expenditures have produced a military establishment less fit to cope with the Soviets. Some equipment has been oversupplied; helicopters purchased from the United States are being cocooned in Iran, according to reliable Western sources. Although the Iranian Air Force with U.S. F-4's is one of the world's best, experts here say the army cannot handle its sophisticated new weaponry.

These critics, until now silenced by transcendent considerations of Nixon-Kissinger geopolitics, may have gained an invaluable ally in Rumsfeld. At the least, he is not about to capitulate to the Iranian general's demand for lower arms prices and more oil.

Considerably less certain but vastly more important is what side, if any, Rumsfeld takes when Simon renews efforts for a new U.S. offensive pitting Saudi Arabia against Iran to break OPEC prices. If Rumsfeld intervenes against Kissinger's policy of exchanging inflated arms for inflated oil, that Jan. 19 luncheon at the Pentagon may prove fateful indeed.

Field Enterprises

NEW YORK TIMES
5 Feb. 1976

KISSINGER WARNS OF DIVISION IN U.S.

He Sees a Greater Threat
at Home Than Abroad

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, seeking support for the Administration's foreign policies, said today that the United States was more endangered by "our domestic divisions" than by overseas adversaries.

Speaking at the University of Wyoming in Laramie, Mr. Kissinger continued his efforts to stem what he has called a self-destructive, isolationist

course in American life.

"It is time we recognize that, increasingly, our difficulties abroad are largely of our own making," he said in the text released by the State Department.

"An effective foreign policy requires a strong national government which can act with assurance and speak with confidence on behalf of all Americans," he said, adding:

"But when the Executive is disavowed repeatedly and publicly, other governments wonder who speaks for America and what an American commitment means. Our Government is in danger of progressively losing the ability to shape events and a great nation that does not shape history eventually becomes its victim."

Referring to moves to curtail covert activities of the intelligence community, Mr. Kissin-

ger said that rivalry with communism continued to make important "the gray area between foreign policy and overt conflict."

"Yet, leaks, sensational investigations and the demoralization of our intelligence services—at a time when our adversaries are stepping up their own efforts—are systematically depriving our Government of the ability to respond," Mr. Kissinger said. Unless the country ends its divisions, he said, "our only option is to retreat—to become an isolated fortress island in a hostile and turbulent global sea, awaiting the ultimate confrontation with the only response we will not have denied ourselves—massive retaliation."

Mr. Kissinger returned to Washington later in the day.

Soviet Assails Kissinger

MOSCOW, Feb. 4 (AP) — The Soviet press agency, Tass, accused Secretary of State Kissinger today of attempting to "distort the foreign policy of the Soviet Union" in a San Francisco speech yesterday.

"Ignoring the actual state of affairs and the generally known fact that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a policy of peace, Kissinger spoke about some kind of Soviet expansion and ascribed aggressive intentions to the Soviet Union," Tass said.

"Among other things, Henry Kissinger tried to justify American interference in Angola with unfounded assertions that it was caused by a 'Soviet intervention' in that African country."

"To put it short, the U.S. Secretary of State juggled with facts in this part of his speech."

Wednesday, Feb. 4, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

Kissinger Urges Debate Without 'Defeatist' Talk

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that the United States must not paralyze itself in world affairs this election year by "withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds."

American-Soviet détente policy is justifiably "an im-

portant part of our national debate," Kissinger said. But, he added, "let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak."

Kissinger's speech to the

Francisco was billed as a major foreign policy address. It was titled, "The Permanent Challenge of Peace: United States Policy Toward the Soviet Union."

Kissinger's purpose appeared to be twofold: to reinforce the Ford administration against can-

policy amounts to "a sell-out" to the Soviet Union and to build a foundation of support for the delayed U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitation pact, which the administration now hopes to conclude this year.

At a State Department briefing to underline yesterday's address, a senior official said it was not primarily a political speech but an attempt to explain long-term U.S. policy in the midst of a national debate over it. The distinction is exceedingly fine.

Kissinger's specific subjects were the ongoing attempt to break the deadlock in the nuclear arms talks (SALT),

and to once again deplore what Kissinger called congressional frustrations of administration attempts "to halt blatant intervention in Angola" by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The prepared text of Kissinger's speech opened with the words: "America enters its third century and its 48th presidential election with unmatched physical strength, a sound foreign policy design, yet scarred by self-doubt."

"If the SALT process falters," Kissinger said, the United States can be thrust into "an accelerated strategic (nuclear) buildup over the next five years that could cost as much as an additional \$20 billion." To travel this path, he said, would be a "tragically missed opportunity."

And yet, Kissinger said, "at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests."

In Angola, he said, "It is charged that the administration acted covertly, without public acknowledgment" of what it was doing to aid anti-Communist factions in that African nation.

"That is correct," Kissinger bluntly agreed, "for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down, as well as to give the greatest possible scope for an African solution."

The Ford administration, Kissinger said, "has a duty to make clear in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola," where there is an "expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops," is a "type of action (that) will not be tolerated again," despite the congressional cutoff of American arms aid.

"The administration will continue to make its case however unpopular it may be temporarily," Kissinger said.

"Let no nation believe," he said, "that Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast supplies of arms to impose minority governments — especially when that expeditionary force

comes from a nation in the Western hemisphere."

No major policy departures were contained in the speech, officials agreed.

Yet the theme, while a repetition of many Kissinger points, implicitly rejected more clearly than before the hyperbolic rhetoric of the Nixon administration years that promised "a generation of peace."

Kissinger headed more determinedly in the opposite direction yesterday:

"Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there are no automatic solutions."

WASHINGTON STAR

4 FEB 1976

William F. Buckley Jr.

We lost the war and now reap the

harvest

The domino theory, seen in retrospect, was really more of a metaphor than the term originally suggested. They used to say that if South Vietnam fell, so would Laos, and then Cambodia, and eventually Thailand; and, perhaps after an interval, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Cambodia and Laos are gone, of course; and Thailand is catapulted into a neutrality which will probably leave it looking something like Burma in a matter of time. But the domino theory's next victim, all this time our parochial gaze was focused on Indochina, is really Angola.

There are very few individual pieces of real estate, viewed only as real estate, that the United States needs to defend in order to defend its own sovereignty. Most of what we have defended we have defended because of its symbolic value. The freedom of Berlin preeminently. Taiwan, and South Korea; and, even, Quemoy and Matsu.

The Congress of the United States has now taken a flat position on Angola. We are not going to defend Angola with American troops — that was always pretty clear. But we are not going to give any aid to Angola. Although President Ford, as commander-in-chief, has asked Congress for exten-

sive aid to Angola, he will apparently be rebuffed. In the words of Sen. Dick Clark, chairman of the relevant subcommittee, "No proposal of any kind of continuing American involvement is going to be accepted by a vast majority of Republicans or Democratic members of Congress."

I do not see the meaning of Sen. Clark's flat statement unless it is this, that the Russian military is welcome to initiate aggression against any country in the world with which we do not have a mutual defense treaty. Angola if it wants to. Zaire — why not? South Africa — and more power to them.

Indeed the question arises whether our mutual defense treaties would really be sufficient to change the mind of Sen. Clark. We had such a thing centered around the SEATO nations, and although never formally repealed, it is for all intents and purposes dead. The Democratic Party platform of 1972 proposed that we officially terminate our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

By what spirit are we guided? What would we do if the Communists, through the use of their agents in Italy, took control of the government there?

Perhaps the best caricature of our current mood was caught in the ceremony

at the airport in Havana where Fidel Castro was saying goodbye to Prime Minister Trudeau and Mrs. Trudeau. When the photographer snapped the picture, it happened that Castro was bent over tying his shoelace.

After reading the caption, the wonder is that Trudeau was not leaning over kissing Castro's behind. He chose, instead, to do so verbally. What he said about the toughest slavemaster in this hemisphere was that he is a leader of "world stature." What he said about Castro's sending Cuban combat troops to interfere in African affairs on the side of the Communists there, to seek to subjugate the country to the will of a Soviet dictator, was that "a great deal of thought and feeling for the situation" went into Castro's decision to send troops to Africa.

One wonders whether Trudeau would say that a great deal of thought and feeling had been put into a move by Fidel Castro if he sent troops to Quebec to liberate the people from Canada.

Trudeau's abject treatment of Castro is exactly in the spirit of those who salivated every time Hitler or Mussolini roared, and who now establish their manhood by going to horror movies about Nazi concen-

tration camps. The domino theory, in a shrunken globe, foretold that the Trudeaus of this world would be bellicose in their treatment of America, and oleaginous in their treatment of Communist dictators, if we lost the war. Well, we lost it, and we are reaping the harvest. As, incidentally, are innocent Angolans.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1976

When Mud Gets in Your Eyes

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

BRUSSELS—Reduced United States bargaining power as expressed in its international dealings—above all with the Soviet Union—faithfully mirrors an ever-increasing rise in Moscow's armed strength. Although the U.S.S.R. is still a relatively weak economic force, especially in agriculture, its industrial, military and technological vigor are impressive.

The Soviet Union is an anomalous country. Its economic base, living standards and productivity are all relatively low as compared with the other superpower, the U.S.A. But by determined allocation of priorities Russia has held its own in strategic and space technology and more than held its own in constructing a vast army and navy. It is a giant with feet still deeply imbedded in the mud but head among the stars. As for us—mud got in our eyes.

Thus, although there can be no comparison between the Soviet industrial structure and that of America, Moscow is becoming ever stronger and increasingly in a position to gain negotiating advantages at Washington's expense. This is reflected in the latest round of bilateral negotiations conducted by Secretary Kissinger. We got nowhere on Angola, which is collapsing into the arms of pro-Soviet elements. We are gradually slipping in the Middle East. Our initial headstart in the SALT talks has faded.

The United States was incredibly lucky during the quarter of a century that followed World War II. It depended on an overwhelming military superiority (based on its navy, air force and nuclear weapons) and a constantly expanding economy. However, in the present decade, both these advantages started to draw to an end.

Our economy is recovering, but unsteadily. And the Soviet military machine is clearly ahead in virtually all respects. Thus the two primordial factors giving us an edge began to weaken simultaneously.

This is the fundamental cause of an altered world balance. It was, of course, stressed by American inability to win the ghastly Vietnam war. It was stressed again by the efforts of a President to enhance his executive powers when he was proven unworthy of such increased authority and the attempt ended in his disgrace.

As a consequence of these twinned disasters America's self-confidence has been diminished, as has the faith of our allies in U.S. military resolve. Moreover, the Presidency has been weakened to such a degree that the Chief Executive cannot operate with the full authority allotted him by the Constitution.

A democratic society has ample flexibility eventually to right such imbalance and correct fundamental flaws. Yet this requires time, probably a great deal of time. And while that time passes, the Soviet Union forges ahead in essential domains on which national and diplomatic power are based.

Secretary Kissinger has tried to continue a supple foreign policy that would minimize the damage to our international position by shifting pieces on the diplomatic chessboard: China, Japan, West Europe, Israel, Egypt. But his moves are increasingly re-

stricted by the realities of our flabbier position and by the recognition of these realities abroad.

One inescapable result of a weakened Presidency and a consequently strengthened legislative branch is reduced freedom of action which the Executive had managed to assert in foreign policy. Mr. Kissinger frequently complains that Congress and the press—well-supplied by Congressional committee leaks—are making it impossible for him to act abroad as he would wish. Other nations agree. Esteem for the United States is lower and our words are not always heeded as before.

When the Secretary of State issues warnings that the United States will not tolerate Soviet-Cuban interference in Angola—and such cautions are ignored; when we take a firm stand on the Lebanon, without discernible effect, faith in American leadership is reduced and starts to waver.

This situation need not be considered permanent. Americans, moreover, have often before demonstrated astonishing vitality and an ability to recover from bad problems. Already the economy gives every sign of resuming its previous tendency to expand. And there is no doubt that technical ingenuity has helped produce ascendancy in certain weapons fields which, by their qualitative advantage, overcome some of Russia's quantitative edge.

But how long will it take to restore some kind of American psychological self-confidence and political serenity? And what will happen to the existing structure of democratic compacts and mutually accepted engagements while the bellwether of the flock is getting back in front of it? These are questions of enormous importance and the answers to them remain unclear.

Western Europe

Los Angeles Times

Tue., Jan. 27, 1976.

U.S. Need Not Fear Italian Communists

'Blanket Hostility' Toward Party's Sharing of Power Is Called Wrong

BY ROBERT J. DONOVAN

NEW YORK—The reported CIA plan to give \$6 million in campaign funds to anti-Communists in Italy has dramatized the growing concern in Washington over the rise of Communist parties in Western Europe, especially in Italy.

The anxiety is fueled by the historic American view that all Communist parties are totalitarian, anti-democratic movements that cannot be dislodged from power once they have won it.

Another large ingredient in American resistance to the increasing acceptability of Communists in Italy is Secretary of State Kissinger's fear that a Communist share of power in a NATO nation would have a falling-domino effect on the security of the alliance.

There is a contrary viewpoint on all of this. It holds that U.S. policy as symbolized by the reported campaign contribution is a short-sighted, risky, counterproductive course that may well strengthen Communist parties in Western Europe and impair future American relations with European governments.

According to this view, the irreversibility of Communist gains in Eastern Europe is due to the presence of Soviet military power, a critical factor that does not obtain in Western Europe. This view also holds that the Italian Communist Party is committed to democratic procedures, is more or less resigned to NATO and represents a bona fide and necessary opposition to the demoralized regime of the Christian Democrats.

Those who take this position also maintain that as Communist parties in Western Europe display moderation, responsibility and adherence to civil liberties, they will exert a long-range liberating effect on the Communist system not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Soviet Union.

An articulate exponent of this case is Dr. Richard H. Ullman, professor of international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and director of "The 1980s Project" of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York—a survey of the problems approaching in the next decade.

A graduate of Harvard, a former Rhodes

scholar and holder of a doctorate from Oxford, whose extensive writings on Europe includes a three-volume work on Anglo-Soviet relations, he is a member of the staff of the National Security Council and the office of the secretary of defense.

"I think we are doing the wrong thing," Ullman said in an interview the other day. "We are making the situation into much more of a problem for ourselves and for our relations with the Europeans than it needed to be."

"The blanket hostility which we have been showing is shortsighted because in some instances the Communist Party is going to come into a position where they will share power and make relations between the government in which they sit and the U.S. government difficult."

"People in this country, and Europe as well, have been mesmerized by the takeover in Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1948 and

Robert J. Donovan is an associate editor of The Times.

the way the Communist parties there have consolidated their hold on power. But in that case the role of Soviet armed forces was vitally important.

"In the case of the Italian Communist Party there is a long record of development quite independent of Moscow. They have reacted very much in response to internal Italian conditions. The Italian Communist Party took a very critical stand at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It opposed the Communists in Portugal and favored the Socialists there. There is no convincing evidence that the party is not prepared to play by the established Constitutional rules."

Once in power, could they be voted out?

"One would think so," Ullman replied. "There is no evidence in any of their statements that that would not be the case. Indeed, they have strongly emphasized that they have a commitment to genuine representative democracy. One says, 'Well, how can one believe what they say?' As William Pfaf pointed out in a recent issue of the New Yorker, it is very unlikely that the Italian

army or the police would stand by any attempt by the Communists unilaterally to seize power."

As for the problem in NATO, Ullman does not believe that in the foreseeable future any government in Western Europe will be taken over completely by the Communists. On the other hand, he thinks that in the next decade or so the Communist Party may win a share of power in the Italian government.

"They have said," he continued, "that they would not attempt to undermine the alliance and believe it is an important element in stabilizing relationships in Europe. I think the Italian Communists would play a much more Romanian role. The Romanians have made statements that they would like to see the end of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, yet the Romanians remain members of the Warsaw Pact. Communists in an Italian government might make similar noises with respect to NATO."

"The presence of Communists in the Italian government would make the sharing of some defense information more difficult, not because the Communists themselves would be less 'loyal' to the NATO ideal but because it is likely that the Soviet government has penetrated the Italian Communist Party and its agents would obtain military secrets. But we have seen that happen even in Germany, the European bulwark of the alliance, where the Social Democrats were penetrated by Moscow."

"Arrangements could be made within NATO to reduce the degree of sharing, for example. The presence of Communists in important positions would make control of defense and information more difficult, no question. But there is nothing we can do to affect that. The United States hasn't much leverage over whether the Communists come to power."

"In Italian society the Communist Party is a vital force, and the specter of their sharing in power does not frighten me. The Christian Democrats have been in power 30 years, and are in a bad way. The other left parties have not taken off. The Italian Communists are the most important party of the left. It is inconceivable that at some stage in the life of a country a force as vital as the Italian Communists should not share power."

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Jan. 25, 1976.

Red Gains in Europe Worry U.S.

BY DON COOK

PARIS—Secretary of State Henry

A. Kissinger has again flown across Europe to Moscow in pursuit of detente, stopping in Copenhagen on the way there and in Brussels and Madrid on the way back to warn of the danger of growing Communist political strength in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

There is a strong cause-and-effect relationship in this. There is indeed a growing Communist problem in Europe. There has been one ever since 1945. The policy of detente, in which

Don Cook is the Times correspondent in Paris.

Europe took the lead back in the 1960s long before Kissinger got into the act, makes the problem a great deal trickier and more volatile and difficult to contain or handle.

Nobody really expected anything different, and that is why a lot of conservative European leaders were and still are considerably more cautious and reserved about detente than Kissinger. Still, Europe has been living with its Communist problem for a long time and there is no reason to think that its democratic leaders have recently fallen asleep and are not paying attention to what is going

on.

Kissinger, on the other hand, has no Communist problem in the United States. This makes it infinitely easier for him to stick doggedly with great-power detente, come what may, while exhorting others who do have the problem to rouse themselves to the danger from within. As usual with Kissinger when he suddenly becomes seized of a problem, it seems to take on new dimensions, like poking a stick in a hornets nest and setting the hornets buzzing.

But Kissinger's public declarations of concern do raise a simple basic matter of political analysis which the American government needs to look at very carefully and prudently in deciding what its long-term policy toward the European Communist problem is going to be. For it is a long-term problem which will have its ups-and-downs in every European election from now on, and will never really be "solved" or go away.

The first question to be asked is how serious is this rise in the Communist party strength in Western Europe—what kind of a threat to NATO stability does it really seem to pose? The second is, what are the factors which will work against it to contain it, and what, in fact, can the United States do about it?

The short answer to the first question, though not the complete answer, is that the marked change in Communist political tactics to take advantage of detente does indeed present the strongest, most effective and most serious challenge in Western Europe in the last 30 years. The Communist party is no longer engaged anywhere in the old frontal assault, revolutionary tactics. Instead it has sought determinedly to enter the political mainstream and swim alongside the democratic parties.

"We are in 1976, and the Communist Party is not immobile," said French party leader Georges Marchais in a notable appearance over French television in early January (The very fact of his TV interview would have been unthinkable in the days of Gen. Charles de Gaulle or even President Georges Pompidou, but detente and the liberal spirits of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing have made a big difference in French television as well as politics).

"The Communist party is not dogmatic and knows how to adapt itself to the conditions of its time," Marchais went on. "Today the word dictatorship no longer corresponds to what we want. It has an intolerable meaning which is contrary to our aspirations and our views. Even the word proletariat is no longer suitable, for we wish to assemble along with the working class the majority of salaried workers."

Not all the French comrades were ready to applaud when their leader suddenly furlled the banner of "proletarian dictatorship"—as letters to l'Humanite subsequently showed. But there is no doubt that the new democratic party line will carry

overwhelmingly when the party congress meets in early February.

Meanwhile, since the Marchais broadcast, a public opinion poll in Le Figaro shows that those who "look favorably" on the Communist Party in France have increased from 27 to 31%. This was not a question of how people would vote—only a question of general attitude. The same poll showed that public confidence in President Giscard d'Estaing's ability to manage France's economic problems has gone up from 56% to 59%.

The Marchais TV interview was the climax of a year-long process for the French Communists of, in effect, climbing on the Italian Communist Party's fast-moving bourgeois middleclass bandwagon. The French party first followed the Italian tactic of taking its distance from Moscow. This was achieved rather painlessly by arranging for l'Humanite to write an editorial asking Soviet authorities to release dissident mathematician Leonid Plyusch from a Ukrainian psychiatric hospital, and then expressing suitable indignation over conditions in Soviet prisons and labor camps as exposed by a British Broadcasting Corp. TV film "if the film is true."

Marchais then capped these moves—which had been sourly received by the Communist Party press in Moscow—by seeking a meeting with his high-riding Italian opposite, Enrico Berlinguer, at which they signed a joint pact in mid-November declaring both the Italian and French Communist Parties to be unequivocally in favor of pluralistic political societies.

In short, Marchais has now successfully taken the French Communist Party to the dry-cleaners in the past six months and has it all dressed up in a fresh suit of clothes.

But the key to the situation in France is not so much the new democratic image of the Communists as it is the tenuous alliance between the Communists and the Socialist Party led by Francois Mitterand. The two parties cling to each other for the simple reason that each thinks it needs the other. The Communists gain electoral respect from the Socialists, and the Socialists seem to gain leftist votes from being allied with the Communists. Yet scarcely a week goes by without some news item showing how uneasy the alliance is below the surface.

It is in Italy, of course, where the

Communist spearhead seems to be on the verge of breaking into the ranks of democratic government. And experts in domino theories for Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere can readily construct a domino theory for Western Europe, where France will be the next to take in Communists and after that Spain and Portugal will have to be written off—and by that time the NATO alliance would be shattered and Europe would no longer be defensible or indeed worth defending.

Such a dire downhill descent for democracies presupposes, however, that there will be no reaction to Communist electoral tactics or that this present sweet smell of success which the Italian and French parties are enjoying will never fade. It presupposes that these things happen in a vacuum. But this is not the case.

You need only go back to Portugal six months ago to see how things can turn around. In the early summer it looked as if there was nothing standing in the way of turning the Portuguese government into a peoples republic. But then suddenly the Socialist Party forces, the moderate military forces, the Catholic church, and the mass of the Portuguese people found themselves in step together. Alvaro Cunhal, Portugal's Communist Party leader, undoubtedly overplayed his hand—a mistake which neither Berlinguer in Italy nor Marchais in Paris intends to make. But you can lose just the same by underplaying a hand.

So there are many factors, many variables, endless political permutations in Italy and France, in Portugal and Spain, which have not even begun to surface in this engagement of Communists trying to fight democracy with democracy's slogans and methods. In France, the challenge is never far from the mind of the French president, and Giscard is a very resourceful and incisive political fighter.

What can the United States do about it all? Very little. It was a lot easier in the Stalin-Dulles era to go out and buy Italian elections, and such cold war methods simply are not going to determine the future in the Brezhnev-Kissinger era. Admittedly the situation may not look as good as it did before detente broke out all over the place. But it is going to be this way for a long time, and worrying about it from Washington is not going to solve it.

Near East

WASHINGTON POST
3 FEB 1976

Bhutto's Pakistan: 'Brutality, Overkill'

By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service

LAHORE, Pakistan, Feb. 2 — Beneath a gloss of political stability, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is wiping out civil liberties and waging a campaign of repression in Pakistan as ruthlessly as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is destroying democracy in neighboring India.

Both leaders say they have been forced to institute tough measures to save their countries from destruction at the hands of their political opponents. In both cases, critics insist that they are attempting to save only themselves.

The root of the animosity between Bhutto and what remains of the vocal opposition is the delicate issue of provincial autonomy. In three of the nation's four provinces — the Northwest Frontier, Baluchistan and Punjab — the prime minister's opponents argue that he is cheating the people of states' rights guaranteed under the federal constitution.

Bhutto claims that what the opposition wants is to divide the nation to the point of fracturing it yet again, a bitter reference to the loss of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan.

Some observers in Islamabad, Pakistan's sprawling modernistic capital, believe that Bhutto has taken encouragement from the failure of the United States and other Western democracies to alter Gandhi's course.

"He seems to feel that if she can get away with it, then he's free to run roughshod here," said one diplomat.

"They must read each other's mail," cracked another observer. "At the bottom line, it's the same thing. They both use the same tactics, brutality and overkill."

Bhutto and Gandhi, long-time political enemies, do have similar records:

— Gandhi dismissed the independent government of the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu Saturday and clamped it under direct central rule. She charged the local government with "maladministration" and "encouraging secessionist tendencies."

Barely a month earlier, Bhutto dismissed the government of Baluchistan, Pakistan's largest but least populated province, and imposed federal rule. He charged the provincial administration with "corruption" and "inefficiency."

— Since imposing a state of emergency June 26, Gandhi has arrested thousands of her political opponents, mainly from rightist parties, and given them no access to the courts. She claimed that many of them were trying to stir the army and police to mutiny.

Last March, Bhutto banned Pakistan's principal opposition party, the National Awami Party, and arrested hundreds of its leaders. They are still imprisoned, with no access to the courts.

— After arming herself with emergency powers, Gandhi went to the Supreme Court of India and won a reversal of a lower-court decision that found her guilty of corrupt election practices. The reversal cost the Supreme Court much of its reputation for independence. The prime minister has since taken other steps that limit court jurisdiction.

After Bhutto banned the National Awami Party, he put the case before the five-man Supreme Court, which unanimously supported his ban. He has claimed that "the courts are entirely independent," but a number of legal experts say Bhutto has intimidated the judiciary.

"In any kind of a serious case," said one constitutional lawyer in Rawalpindi, "the judges will bend over backwards to please him."

— Although Gandhi has concentrated her fury on rightist opponents, a number of her own Congress Party members who took exception to her tactics also were imprisoned.

In October, armed police opened fire on a political rally being addressed in Lahore by Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Bhutto's former protegee in the Pakistan People's Party. According to witnesses, police opened fire without provocation and killed between 20 and 40 persons.

A few days later, 11

members of the party, including two members of the Punjab provincial assembly, were taken into police custody. They have not been heard of since, and the police claim that they have no knowledge of their abduction.

Then, during a National Assembly session in November, at which Bhutto was pushing through a constitutional amendment limiting dissent, police beat up several protesting opposition members and physically threw them out of the building.

— Since imposing the state of emergency, Gandhi has hammered through a series of constitutional amendments and, according to reports from New Delhi, is considering major constitutional changes to replace the parliamentary form of government with a presidential system.

Bhutto, in turn, has amended the four-year-old constitution of Pakistan, of which he himself was an architect, repeatedly, eroding the fundamental rights of Pakistanis.

Under these amendments, Bhutto can ban political parties without referring to the Supreme Court and can jail persons suspected of threatening national security indefinitely without trial. They are also deprived of the right to bail.

Yet, despite these major assaults on Pakistan's frail democratic institutions, Bhutto retains a favorable image abroad, particularly in the West. Part of the explanation is Bhutto's adroit personal handling of foreign press coverage.

Since coming to power four years ago, when Pakistan's world-wide image had suffered as a result of its army's brutality during the Bangladesh war of secession, he has carefully nurtured relationships with Western journalists.

While keeping the domestic press tightly muzzled, he seldom, if ever, has refused visiting correspondents interviews; during these he generally speaks at length and with apparent candor. At 47, Bhutto can display the maturity of an elder statesman, the intellect of an Oxford scholar (which he was), the insights of a historian and the charm of a polished diplomat.

These attributes immediately cast him in a more favorable light than Gandhi, who, when she sees journalists at all, seems reticent, chilly and less than candid.

In political terms, except for

a brief period after Pakistan was partitioned out of India at the time of independence in 1947, it was ruled by military dictators. By comparison, superficially at least, Bhutto seems to be a liberal and a democrat.

Dozens of Pakistanis, in conversations over the past two weeks in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and here in Lahore, expressed distaste for Bhutto and his repressive policies.

"Admittedly, we've had a tradition of one strongman after another," a Rawalpindi businessman said. "But we're sick of it. It's time the people had a say in their own government."

Theoretically, the people will have the opportunity to express their will in general elections by August 1977. So far Bhutto has not announced an election date because, as he said in an interview recently, "I must have the advantage of knowing which is the right time."

Some analysts believe that he will schedule the vote well before the deadline to head off efforts by Khar and another former follower, Hanif Ramay, to build up a popular base in Punjab, the key to all political strength in Pakistan.

Few observers believe that Khar and Ramay could topple Bhutto in nationwide elections, but there is some agreement that they could make important inroads into his dominance of the Punjab.

Bhutto's political opponents claim that although he came to power as a democrat and a socialist, he has since reverted to what they say are his basic dictatorial instincts.

"He has changed unbelievably," Khar said in an interview. "He had fought against dictatorship and for democracy, to improve the life of the people and give them justice. But Pakistan has never had such dictatorship as under Mr. Bhutto. It is the worst ever."



WASHINGTON STAR
1 FEB 1976

Don't Write Off Angola Just Because Kissinger's Involved

By Colin Legum

Speaking here in Addis Ababa the other day, Charles C. Diggs Jr. — a congressman whose friendship and judgment I value — said, "American intrusion in the Angolan conflict is the biggest blunder in the history of its relations with Africa and may be the most serious foreign policy miscalculation it has ever made." A bigger blunder than the U.S. track record in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia? A more serious foreign policy miscalculation than even Vietnam?

Chuck it Charlie, and all the other liberal "Charlies," like Anthony Lewis, Senators Tunney, Clark and Culver — all valued friends whose attitudes and policies I generally share. But the Angola affair seems to have produced a rush of blood to the head of American liberals which has apparently made it impossible to distinguish between the issues involved in the great American debate following on Vietnam, Watergate and the CIA exposures and the real issues raised by Angola.

The result could be — probably already has been — the betrayal of vital liberal principles in Angola. And why? Because everything that flows from Henry Kissinger must be wrong and must be condemned. One gets the impression from this distance that if Kissinger were to say that Angola should be handed over to the Russian sphere of interest, liberals would rise in unison to condemn him for rank appeasement; and if he says that the Russians are indulging in reckless power politics in Angola he will be equally attacked.

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"Henry can do no right" seems to have become a substitute for objective thinking. Is one right in supposing (as the Russians seem to believe) that the U.S. is to be prevented from playing any effective international role so long as Kissinger is in office? You liberals sometimes make it sound that way.

I don't need reminding of the stupid errors made by Kissinger and Nixon in southern Africa — errors that some of us have tried (but most-

ly failed) to get liberals to pay serious attention to because of preoccupation with Vietnam. Now, because of preoccupation with the post-Vietnam situation, you liberals seem to be more concerned with limiting U.S. power in foreign affairs (which can make you sound almost isolationist) rather than with putting forward constructive policies to meet foreign crises such as Angola.

A hard judgment? Well, what must one make of Anthony Lewis' statement in the New York Times that Ford and Kissinger "exaggerate the impact of distant events on their country's reputation?" A chilling phrase in liberal eras — *distant events*. Is this not the stock phrase of isolationists? Was there not once a British prime minister who, wishing to diminish public interest in his proposals for betraying Benes' Czechoslovakia, described it as a small and faraway country? It has always been a trick of the conservatives to make foreign problems seem remote in order to make it easier to have them dismissed as having little bearing on national interests, and as a means of combatting internationalism.

Czechoslovakia is in fact a good analogy to use in Angola's case. The Czechoslovakia of Dubcek was destroyed when a tightly-organized Marxist minority was helped to, and later kept in, power through foreign military intervention. And that is precisely what seems to be happening in Angola through Russian/Cuban military support for the Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA). An equally undesirable situation would arise if the MPLA's two rivals — the front for the national liberation (FNLA) and the Union for Total Independence (UNITA) — were to be hoisted to power through American and other foreign military aid.

The central reality about the Angolan situation, whatever view one likes to take about any of the three rival movements, is that *none* of them individually commands the majority support of all Angolans. That was the view taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at their summit meeting last June when it decided that all three movements had an equally valid claim to sharing in the government of independence. Developments since then — principally caused by racist South Africa's intervention in Angola — led the OAU extraordinary summit at its meeting here to divide equally (23 African states on each side) between those supporting MPLA's claim to

being the legitimate government and those who continue to uphold the equal right of all three movements to share in power.

This serious division in Africa and the deepening tragedy of Angola is the result primarily of foreign involvement — but not just, as American liberals sometimes seem to suggest, because of Washington's involvement: all the fault of Henry. Perhaps we can steer the debate along more sensible lines by establishing, so far as is possible, the role of the three Angolan liberation movements and of the foreign powers.

The MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, is in no sense a Communist movement but a radical nationalist movement led by an impressive Marxist elite. The strong appeal it makes is that its leadership includes black Angolans, Portuguese Angolans and Mesticos (Angolans of mixed race, an important element among the elite). Because it received strong, if inconsistent, support from Russia during the liberation struggle — and more especially after the Portuguese collapse — the MPLA is more strongly oriented toward Moscow. This upsets the Chinese even more, perhaps, than the West. But for all its strong points, the MPLA is a minority party, confined largely to the elites and to tribal support in the central area. Its only hope of gaining power is through military supremacy, which means strong foreign support.

The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, draws its major support from among the Bakongo people in the north, but even they are disillusioned with its leadership. Its real strength comes from the neighboring state of Zaire whose president, Gen. Mobutu, has backed it strongly for reasons of his own national interests since he is suspicious of a pro-Russian government emerging as his neighbor. The FNLA has pronounced black racist attitudes which, however, have not prevented it from entering into an unholy alliance with white South Africa to gain Vorster's military support.

UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, finds its strongest support among the Ovimbundu people of the South who are numerically predominant in Angola. It counts on strong support from Portuguese Angolans. It, too, is a radical nationalist movement which, if elections had been possible after independence, would undoubtedly have emerged as the largest party. Certainly its leader is the most charismatic of the leaders and was seen as the best leader by influential

African presidents, including Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and even Gen. Mobutu.

UNITA is uncomfortably allied with FNLA, although Savimbi has much more in common with the MPLA. Undoubtedly Angola's best hope would have been a UNITA-MPLA coalition, but this was strongly resisted by Neto's Marxist lieutenants.

Foreign power involvement has been a feature of the Angolan struggle from the beginnings of the armed liberation struggle there in 1961. The country most directly involved in that struggle has been Zaire, whose role contributed largely to the country's disaster. Zaire's other neighbor, the People's Republic of the Congo, played an important if minor role in buttressing the MPLA.

When Holden Roberto's forces launched the armed conflict, the Kennedy administration (encouraged by liberals) provided clandestine support, using Tunisia as the conduit for a CIA operation. (Incidentally, the CIA also channeled funds for Frelimo's struggle through the Mozambique Institute. I have yet to hear liberal voices complaining about CIA support for these anti-Portuguese liberation forces.) By 1963, however, the U.S. had ended its support for Roberto and when the Nixon-Kissinger administration took office, U.S. policy reverted to support for Lisbon. That blunder is being paid for today.

The FNLA enjoyed exclusive recognition from the OAU until the end of 1964, but because of its failure to wage an effective struggle, support was switched to the MPLA which, by then, was already getting Russian, Cuban and Chinese support. However, MPLA in its turn was weakened by internal struggles and by 1973 the Portuguese were able to transfer some of their troops from Angola to buttress their crumbling position in Mozambique. Faced with this situation, Presidents Mobutu, Nyerere and Kaunda agreed to ask the Chinese to provide urgent military support for the FNLA to enable them to fight more effectively. That was how the Chinese came to be more closely involved in the Angolan struggle behind FNLA, but still continued to support the MPLA as well. Only UNITA failed to attract any African or other foreign support and was left to struggle as best it could on a comparatively restricted scale. The Russian reaction to Chinese support for FNLA was to increase its own support for MPLA, but a split in its ranks in 1973 led Moscow to play an extraordinary and unsavory role in the Angolan liberation struggle.

Russia decided to abandon Neto, whose relations with Moscow had never been easy, and to back his challenger Daniel Chipenda, then based in Zambia. But when it became clear that Chipenda's challenge was failing, the Russians invited Neto to Moscow to mend their relations. They managed to retrieve something of their shaken relationship by warning Neto that their intelligence had uncovered a plot by Chipenda to assassinate him on his return to Zambia. (It is

such a plot really existed, but it is quite possible.) However, Neto's people pre-empted the assassination by launching an attack on Chipenda and his supporters in Zambia, which was put down only with difficulty by the Zambian security forces. Chipenda then went over to the FNLA and it was he — briefly the favorite son of Moscow — who in the middle of last year went to Namibia to establish a military link between FNLA and the South Africans.

Unfortunately, the absence of a free press and a dedicated liberal lobby in Moscow makes it impossible to expose the role of the Russian clandestine agencies in Angola. So, although the Chinese yielded to the OAU directive in June 1975 calling for equal support for the three Angolan rivals and for the ending of all foreign involvement, the Russians pointedly challenged the African decision. They tried, but failed, to bludgeon the OAU chairman, Uganda's President Idi Amin, to declare himself in favor of MPLA, which led briefly to the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries. And they gambled on paralysis in U.S. foreign policymaking machinery to make their challenge in Angola. All this forms part of a discernible new Russian strategy in Africa.

Kissinger's own reaction was to go along with the OAU policy and to end U.S. intervention. Gulf Oil — the biggest U.S. economic interest in Angola — was permitted to switch its payments for oil royalties from Cabinda to a secret account opened by MPLA in Europe. Kissinger also sought to persuade the Russians to join in a policy of both superpowers staying out of Angola — a sensible proposal. It was only when the Russians refused to accept this offer that Kissinger, in an attempt to show Moscow that the U.S. could not simply be stood off, overrode his own State Department advisers and attempted to get another tranche of U.S. military aid for FNLA/UNITA through Congress. The liberal leadership, in getting the Senate to refuse his request, both prevented a deeper U.S. involvement in Angola and gave a green light to the Russians to increase their military aid and to infiltrate over 5,000 Cubans into Angola.

From the viewpoint of those who seek to prevent further U.S. involvement in Angola, this is undoubtedly a successful result. But it had one other catastrophic consequence. When FNLA saw that it could not rely on effective Western aid and that they were bound to be crushed by MPLA through their superior Russian/Cuban support, they chose to make "an alliance with the devil" — South Africa. The Vorster regime, panicked by the unwillingness of the West to resist the Russian moves in Angola, recklessly committed itself to intervention. Although the deal was with FNLA, the South Africans' incursion through southern Angola inevitably resulted in their becoming involved also with UNITA.

With Africa's hated enemy, South Africa, engaged on the side against MPLA, the predictable result was to harden support for the MPLA. This way Africa became divided and

half the African states abandoned their previous policy of staying neutral.

After the Portuguese collapse, the U.S. had to reassess its position. Kissinger — as might have been predicted — was at first completely opposed to any new foreign involvement, least of all in Africa — a continent about which he has cared little and knows even less. In the few decisions he has made there he has invariably been wrong — as in his notorious endorsement of Option 2 in the National Security Council Memorandum No. 39 of 1970, which was based on the premises that the anti-Portuguese liberation movements were bound to fail. However, his reluctance to intervene was overcome by strong pressures from President Mobutu who, in early 1975, persuaded the U.S. to provide increased military support for his own army and, through it, for FNLA and UNITA. It was his mistaken action that involved the U.S. in the Angolan rivalries.

Nevertheless the suggestion that this move by Kissinger produced Russia's greater involvement in Angola shows a total misunderstanding of Moscow's strategy. The real reason for its intervention has very little to do with U.S.-Soviet rivalries and has everything to do with Soviet-Chinese rivalries, a factor not sufficiently taken into account these days. It is easier for both Moscow and Peking to reach an accommodation with Washington than it is for either to concede to each other an enlargement of their influence in Asia or Africa. So the Chinese in their secret diplomacy have been urging Washington to play a more convincing role in Angola. *For the hard-headed rulers of Peking the ability of the U.S. and its Western allies to resist a successful Russian strategy in Angola has become something of a test for their policy of detente with Washington.*

And why are the Russians so concerned about the Chinese in Africa? It is because Chinese influence in Africa has increased at a time when their own fortunes have steadily declined.

The present outlook is that the MPLA may be on its way to achieving a military victory and will then be able to rely on its foreign backers to repress their opponents and to establish their authority in Angola. This might not matter much to those who are predominantly concerned with U.S. foreign policy, but it surely matters to liberals who, for the same reason that we protested what happened to Dubcek's Czechoslovakia, should protest the use of foreign power to establish a minority regime in Angola — whether it is through the agency of the Russians and Cubans or the South Africans. The argument is used by some liberals that it won't matter in the long run if the Russians should achieve a military-diplomatic victory in Angola because past experience teaches that such victories (vide Egypt) are short-lived. I accept this analysis, but subject it to one heavy qualification. The Russians were finally rejected by the Egyptians in 1956 and the damaging wars had been fought and the Western

position had been permanently changed in the Middle East. Whether these developments were good or bad is not the immediate issue; what is relevant is that even a temporary Russian gain can produce vital changes.

The success of the Russians in Angola will undoubtedly affect the level of big-power involvement in the coming violent struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa (in that order). This is not a prospect that should be welcomed by internationalists who, while supporting the ending

of white supremacy in southern Africa, are at the same time concerned about the immediate impact on East-West detente (surely a liberal cause if ever there was one) and on the nature of the successor governments in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. We can all surely agree that the right policy to pursue in Angola and southern African is to limit foreign involvement — which of course also means withholding Western support from the Smith regime in Rhodesia and the Vorster regime in South Africa.

But what must the U.S. and the rest of the West do if the Russians aggressively insist on maintaining their diplomatic-military thrust? Obviously the best answer is for the West to use whatever diplomatic means it possesses to discourage the Russians and to get behind the Africans who also have an interest in minimizing foreign involvement in their affairs. But we should stop the present tendency of seeking to put all the blame on the U.S. or on the West for the present foreign involvement in Angola.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, February 5, 1976

Joseph C. Harsch

Moscow overcommitted in Angola

I begin to suspect that the wiser minds in the Kremlin are beginning to wish that they had never heard of Angola. True, their chosen local client, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, is reported to be still winning such battles or skirmishes as are taking place. But at latest reports even their military progress seems to have slowed down. And against whatever Angolan acreage they have overrun must be set a remarkably high cost in other forms of international coinage.

The debit side of the Kremlin ledger on Angola now shows the following items:

1. Western Europe, which has a larger economic and strategic interest in Angola than does the United States, is alarmed and doing something about it. The CIA is not the only source of funds for the anti-Popular Movement forces in Angola. Some has come from Britain, Belgium and France.

2. The NATO alliance, long suffering from a tendency to sleepiness, has come alive again.

3. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has called off any further efforts to persuade the Congress to give the Soviets most-favored-nation treatment.

4. The price to Moscow for a SALT II agreement with the United States has gone up. It will have to be very high indeed if the agreement is to get senatorial consent in the Washington of today.

5. The pending defense budget in Washington is already up about \$10 billion above the original Ford administration intention. It may go higher. The Soviet adventure in Angola is the best argument the Pentagon generals and admirals could possibly have had. They were in trouble for arguments — until the Kremlin obliged with Angola.

6. Detente has been tarnished. It was still a nice word up to the disclosure of the Soviet adventure in Angola. It's a bad word now, both in the United States and throughout Western Europe. The Chinese have long called it a "sham detente." A lot of Americans and Europeans are now agreeing with the Chinese.

7. Moscow has been so annoyed over criticism of its Angola policy that it has lashed out publicly not only at Margaret Thatcher, leader of Britain's opposition Tory Party, but even at Dr. Kissinger himself.

8. The widening gap between the United States and its West European allies over the subject of communism has for the moment at least been bridged.

Moscow stands to gain very little in return for this price. Yes, it may end up with a lodgment of sorts on the shore of the South Atlantic Ocean. But how long-lasting is that lodgment likely to be?

After all, the Russians are white and come from a palpably imperial power. Perhaps Moscow has learned something from the collapse of its Egyptian adventure. At least, it sent darker Cuban soldiers, not its own whiter Russian soldiers, into Angola. Perhaps the Russians will manage to be less arrogant and less visible in Angola than they were in Egypt.

But a Soviet military and diplomatic presence in Angola is bound to be conspicuous and unpopular from the moment that the Popular Movement in Angola settles down within fixed boundaries and comes to terms with its neighbors. At that moment Soviet aid ceases to be an asset. Instead it becomes an embarrassment to the local leaders in Luanda. And from that moment the Soviet position in Angola becomes defensive rather than offensive.

The Western world still suffers from the Orwellian fallacy. George Orwell was brilliantly correct in his identification of the Soviet system and methods. Stalinism does attempt to convert mankind into an "Animal Farm." And Stalinism might well be dominant in the world by "1984" were it not for one factor which Orwell overlooked. The questioning and inquiring human mind is tough and persistent. Because of its toughness it is a fact that to this day communism has never won and kept a country without the presence of the Soviet Army.

A Soviet lodgment in Angola would be more exposed and vulnerable than ever was the American lodgment in Vietnam because the Soviet Union does not have the supply and support capability of the United States. It can bring 10,000 Cuban soldiers to Angola, and supply them there, yes, but not the 500,000 which the United States sent to Vietnam.

During World War II the United States Navy by-passed many a Japanese garrison on some Pacific island. Each was left "to wither on the vine." A Soviet lodgment in Angola would sooner or later wither on the vine. Meanwhile it has worked wonders for the NATO alliance and done Moscow policies more damage than anything since the suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

BALTIMORE SUN
30 Jan. 1976

Toehold in Quicksand

Through its intervention in the Angolan civil war, the Soviet Union has clearly shown a greater appetite for superpower meddling than the Vietnam-weary United States. So confident is Moscow of success that it now hints it is ready for a coalition government which the pro-Soviet Popular Movement, backed by 7,000 Cuban troops, could be expected to dominate. That the Kremlin move came just as Secretary Kissinger was rather desperately asking a resistant Congress to approve "overt" aid for retreating pro-Western factions merely pointed up the seeming imbalance. The Soviet Union has shown a willingness to commit its prestige and its surrogate Cuban forces 8,000 miles from its borders. The United States, having so extended itself a decade earlier, has been divided and ineffective in its response.

"If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention," Mr. Kissinger asked yesterday, "what will be the perception of the leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security?" His implied answer was that leaders doubtful of American steadfastness will accommodate to Soviet power and expansionism. Yet if we look no farther than Angola's eastern border we find one leader, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, who is far from supine in the face of the Soviet menace. Denouncing the "plundering tiger

(Russia) with its deadly cubs (Cubans) coming through the back door," Mr. Kaunda has bluntly warned his people they are at war against foreign meddlers who have cut Zambia's copper ore export route on the Benguela railroad across Angola.

The enmity of so respected an African leader as Mr. Kaunda must be a source of worry to the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the African independence era two decades ago, Mr. Kaunda has been in the front line against the minority white rule that holds sway in Rhodesia and South Africa. He still is. But now, because of the Russian intervention in Angola, he is also in the front line against a new form of white power.

Zambia's case should be a warning to those Russians who are capable of learning from America's Vietnam experience. Heady as it might be to have a puppet regime in Luanda, Angola is an entanglement that has already poisoned Soviet relations with Zambia, Zaire and several other African states, not least Morocco, which sees Angolan parallels in its struggle against Soviet-backed elements for control of the Spanish Sahara. The Russians may find that their African toehold is in quicksand. While the United States should stay out of this morass, it may yet work out a carefully controlled arrangement between the administration and Congress to help the Kenneth Kaundas of Africa elude the Soviet grasp.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
27 Jan. 1976

After the new Sahara incident Hella Pick assesses the next move in the super-power wargame

Cuba on the African tightrope

A US-BUILT jet fighter has been shot down over Mauritania by a Soviet-built Sam 6 missile. The jet fighter belonged to the Moroccan Air Force, and the missile to the Algerians. It was the gravest incident so far in the fighting between Morocco and Algeria over the former Spanish Sahara.

Although the US and Soviet Union have kept out of the dispute, the fact that Cuban advisers are now appearing on the scene with the Algerians, and that Algeria procures some of its weapons in the USSR, while the Moroccans shop in the US, are ominous pointers that the Western Sahara, like Angola, may soon be drawn into the troubled landscape of the Super-Power relationships.

Cuba is the common denominator in Angola and the Sahara. Cuba also manages the seemingly impossible tight-rope act of playing a leading role with Algeria in the nonaligned movement and acting as one of the Soviet Union's closest allies.

Only very recently, Fidel Castro proclaimed, "his 'unlimited confidence' in the country of Lenin, and there is no doubt at all that the large Cuban presence in Angola has been orchestrated by Moscow. But the Cuban intervention in Angola also has strong Algerian support. Cuba and Algeria have a long history of close cooperation that dates back before Algerian independence in 1962.

The impetus behind the still very limited Cuban presence in the Sahara probably stems from Algeria rather than the USSR. But there are close ties between the USSR and Algeria, while relations with Morocco are much more tenuous. Rabat has been openly suggesting that Russia is backing Algeria in its support for the Polisario Nationalist movement in the Sahara.

Washington has been watching the fighting in the Sahara with some disquiet. Though hardly in the same league as Angola, the Sahara has important strategic as well as economic importance.

Above all, the US is concerned that the Kremlin may see this as yet another opportunity to extend its influence in Africa.

Whether Washington can do anything about it is another matter. So far, the Administration's attempts to restrain the USSR in Angola have failed.

The USSR is unrepentant, and quite clearly determined to help the MPLA drive home its victory. With the South Africans bitterly complaining that they were left to hold the baby for Western interests in Angola, the USSR is convinced that it has not only won some valuable new friends in the Third World, but has scored a major round against the United States.

Dr. Kissinger's bag of retaliatory threats was empty when he went to Moscow last week. President Ford has already ruled out a wheat embargo as a way of teaching the USSR restraint. This was not only done to placate the US farm lobby, but because the Administration continues to believe that the best way

of guiding the USSR into a more acceptable use of its power is to multiply its trade links with the West, and create an economic dependence that would restrain aggression.

Moscow claims that it can do without economic assistance from the West. What it does want, it says, is a SALT agreement, and it clearly also wants a demonstration that these negotiations can move forward regardless of quarrels with the United States over Angola and expansionism in other parts of the world. By going to Moscow Dr. Kissinger has now provided such a demonstration.

The US is now facing a deep dilemma. Dr. Kissinger remains convinced that an agreement to limit the strategic arms race is vital. But it is hard to see how this can now be achieved without persuading the Soviet leadership that it cannot seek to extend its influence in the Third World, possibly also in Yugoslavia, without risking retaliation from the West.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 Jan. 1976

HOUSE VOTE ENDS AID TO ANGOLANS IN REBUFF TO FORD

His Last-Minute Appeal to
Counter Soviet Moves
Is Rejected, 323-99

VETO TERMED UNLIKELY

But the President Expresses
'Grave Concern' About
Repercussions Abroad

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 — Brushing aside a last-minute plea from President Ford, the House gave final approval today to a Congressional cutoff of aid for two Western-supported factions in the Angolan civil war. The vote was 323 to 99.

Last month the Senate voted, 54 to 22, to block an Administration request for \$28 million for the covert funding of forces opposing the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

The cutoff was voted as an amendment to a \$112.3 billion defense appropriations bill. After the House vote, which moved the legislative package to the White House, a spokesman there said it was unlikely that Mr. Ford would veto the bill as amended "since it doesn't make sense to risk billions needed by defense for \$28 million for Angola."

In a letter delivered this morning to the House Speaker, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, President Ford had expressed "grave concern over the international consequences of the situation in Angola."

Soviet Spending Cited

Asserting that the Soviet Union had spent "almost \$200 million" in Angola and had facilitated the transport of 10,000 Cuban combat troops to fight with the Popular Movement, Mr. Ford declared that abandoning the two Angolan factions "will inevitably lead our friends and supporters to conclusions about our steadfastness and resolve."

"I believe," Mr. Ford said, "that resistance to Soviet expansion by military means must be a fundamental element of United States foreign policy."

But Mr. Albert was scornful

of the plea, calling it "a typical Ford operation — wave your hand, make a gesture and that's the end of it." He added:

"One thing about foreign aid, military aid or war itself, you either do enough or you're better off not doing anything."

\$32 Million From U. S.

Many other members of the House voiced similar objections that the Angola actions of the Administration were too little and too late. The Administration has spent a total of \$32 million since last July on the National Front for Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

After the house vote, Mr. Ford issued a statement expressing "regrets" that it put the United States on record as "refusing help" to friends in Africa.

The President said that the action meant the United States "will ignore a clear-cut act of Soviet-Cuban expansion by brute military force into areas thousands of miles from either country." This, he concluded, causes "serious harm" to United States security interests.

In reviewing the Administration's effort to get Congressional approval of its program of covert aid to Angola, high officials of the State Department noted that chairmen of six Congressional committees had been briefed a total of 25 times from late July to early December and that additional briefings had been given individual members of Congress or entire committees by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby.

But Mr. Kissinger said later that the Administration's appeal for additional Angola funds last December had been "botched."

He said he believed that if the Administration had scaled down its request from \$28 million to \$10 million at that time it would have obtained approval. This, he said, would have enabled the United States-backed forces in Angola to create a military stalemate with the Popular Movement and the Cuban units supporting it.

Kissinger Was Away

Mr. Kissinger was in Europe when the Angola aid request was sent to Congress, and it was handled principally by White House aides. State Department officials said later it should properly have been handled by Mr. Kissinger and his staff.

In contrast to the impassioned debate in the Senate, which lasted four days before the vote Dec. 19, the House discussion before its vote took less than an hour and was CLAM.

George H. Mahon, the Texas Democrat who managed the appropriations bill, led off in defense of the Administration's

Angola aid request, saying that "Time has passed by" and has worked to the advantage of the Soviet-backed forces.

He said that further American "covert aid at this time is impossible," because of the gains of the Popular Movement. He called the House vote a "technical issue," but added that "we must avoid sending a signal to the Communists that we are going to withdraw from the real world."

But other Congressmen apparently had November elections on their minds and the possibility of vulnerability at the polls if they voted for more money for Angola. John L. Burton, Democrat of California,

said that anyone who voted for more aid "might as well start drawing retirement pay."

Andrew Young, Democrat of Georgia, recalled the plaque of the Popular Movement representatives who visited the United States last summer. He quoted one as having said, "Don't force us into the 1/2 Soviet camp and make us another Cuba."

Mr. Young then spoke of failures of Soviet intervention in other parts of Africa and said: "The Russians have been everywhere. They can't sat anywhere because the Russians are worse fascists than the Americans."

He was applauded by other black Congressmen.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 Jan. 1976

KISSINGER REPORTS U. S. IS WEIGHING OPEN ANGOLAN AID

Tells Senate Subcommittee
Such Assistance Must Be
Larger Than Covert Help

OPPOSITION PREDICTED

Clark Sees 'Vast Majority'
in the Congress Rejecting
Further Involvement

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 — Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said today that the Ford Administration is now seriously considering open financial aid to two Angolan factions fighting a Soviet-supported nationalist movement.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, he said the overt assistance would have to be "considerably larger" than the \$32 million sent to the two groups covertly by the United States last year.

Mr. Kissinger said it was not in the national interest "to have another public confrontation" over military assistance to the Angolan factions such as occurred in the Congressional votes to cut off further secret aid.

Therefore, he said, "we will soon be consulting with the Congress" before making an aid request.

Later, Senator Dick Clark, the subcommittee chairman who had called the hearings, said that "no proposal of any

kind of continuing American involvement is going to be accepted by the vast majority of Republicans or Democratic members of Congress."

Mr. Clark, Democrat of Iowa, added that he detected a revulsion in the Congress against a United States role as "world policeman" and that, besides, fresh aid to Angola would be of such a magnitude as to be unacceptable.

[Refugees from the small corner of northwestern Angola not yet occupied by Soviet-supported forces said in Zaire that they had left an area of chaos and mass flight. Western embassies in Zaire's capital received written Angolan appeals for help to prevent collapse of the southern front as well. Page 4.]

Restraint Is Sought

Mr. Kissinger said his rationale for continuing aid was to encourage the Soviet Union and Cuba to exercise restraint in international affairs and not to seek unilateral advantage by "massive" military actions. He said:

"Our principal objective has been to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in part through the expeditionary force of a client state."

He then remarked that the Soviet Union had supplied \$179 million in arms to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and had enabled 11,000 Cuban soldiers to fight on its behalf.

The combined Popular Movement and Cuban forces have been pressing offensives for the last few weeks against both opposing groups—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

"Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviets

have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice," Mr. Kissinger said. "It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit, and it is the first time that Congress has halted the executive's action while it was in the process of meeting that kind of threat."

Asked later by Senator Jacob K. Javits, the New York Republican, to expand on this aspect of his opening statement, Mr. Kissinger declared:

"The Soviet Union must not be given any opportunity to use military forces for aggressive purposes without running the risk of conflict with us."

'A Global Monroe Doctrine'

Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Delaware Democrat inquired then whether this was

the enunciation of "a global Monroe Doctrine"—a reference to the declaration of President James Monroe in 1823 that the United States would view as hostile any attempt by a European power to dominate a Latin-American country.

Mr. Kissinger said this was not the case. But he added that if the United States indicated it was uninterested in protecting "anything outside Europe and Japan" this would leave the rest of the world "open to Soviet attack." This, he said was "not a doctrine but a reality."

At another point in the hearing Mr. Kissinger was asked whether the United States might have provoked large-scale Soviet intervention by authorizing transmission of \$300,000 to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola in January 1975.

He responded that the money had been used for "bicycle and office equipment, not arms," and that he did not see how it could have "triggered" a Soviet supply build-up. Earlier he asserted that the Soviet Union began heavy weapons shipments to the Popular Movement "in the fall of 1974."

Mr. Kissinger also countered an assertion by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro, repeated today at a Havana news conference, that Cuban troops had entered battle only after intervention by South African forces on the side of the Western supported forces in late October.

Mr. Kissinger said that according to intelligence reports, Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers arrived in Angola last August.

The hearing did not touch

on the commentary on today's issue of the Soviet paper Izvestia, which suggested that the Soviet Union would accept a "political solution" to the Angolan crisis.

Mr. Kissinger was later given a summary of the Izvestia article, but he was said to have declined to draw any conclusions because the Soviet Union had not communicated such a suggestion to the United States Government.

Other State Department officials expressed some interest in the paper's commentary because, they said, they had held the belief for more than seven weeks that the Popular Movement would eventually propose coalition talks at least to the National Union for Total Independence of Angola, when it was assured that the Soviet-supported faction would dominate Angola.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1976

Angolan Leftist Charges U.S. With Economic War

Prime Minister Notes State Department Pressure on Gulf Oil to Suspend Operations in Cabinda Area

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

LUANDA, Angola, Jan. 31—The head of the government set up by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola charged last night that the United States was "waging economic war on Angola."

In an interview admittedly aimed at American public opinion, Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento said in his office at the old Portuguese palace that State Department pressure on the Gulf Oil Company to suspend its operations in Cabinda and to withhold about \$200 million in royalties constituted a new phase in the war in Angola.

Gulf Oil announced in December that it had suspended its operations in Cabinda, a province separated from Angola by a sliver of Zaire, as a result of the civil war between the Popular Movement and two rival factions. It said that it was prepared to place oil royalties in escrow until the conflict was settled. Gulf said it had withdrawn "most" of its foreign personnel in compliance with a State Department request.

"Dr. Kissinger knows that our economy has been traditionally geared to Western technology," said Mr. do Nascimento, a 38-year-old former labor organizer in a Luanda brewery.

"Fifty percent of our trade is in petroleum and coffee has been with the U.S. So it is natural that they think that we have the greatest possibility of affecting us through the economic sector. But despite this I don't think they will win this war. I think the Cuban example should be a lesson to the U.S."

The Prime Minister emphasized that his Government would prefer to maintain its commercial links to United States companies on terms of "mutual respect and benefit" but that it was prepared to find alternate markets if Washington prevented American companies from working here. He said he received a cablegram from Gulf today and thought some decisions would be made after the company's directors met on Feb. 10.

"We are not going to let Gulf asphyxiate us, we are not prepared to let the oil remain in the ground while we need capital for our people," the Prime Minister said during a free-wheeling two-hour discussion he led in his shirtsleeves.

He said plans for oil production had been discussed with "some of the oil-producing countries that have recognized us." He did not specify, but the Soviet Union, Algeria, Nigeria, Iraq and Libya are among such countries.

Mr. do Nascimento acknowledged that his Government was seeking to "sensitize American public opinion"

through the press and through infrequent contact with U.S. legislators and their staffs.

At the interview, held for four American and two British journalists, he said he wanted the American people to see the wrongness of their Government's Angolan policies.

He said he did not believe that Secretary of State Kissinger, whom he called a very bright man, really thought that the Luanda administration would come under Soviet domination or that it would allow the Soviet Union a naval base.

Constitution Is Quoted

In an earlier interview, Luis de Almeida, the Government's director of information, stressed that the constitution of the People's Republic of Angola specifically says "the republic will not join any international military organization or allow any foreign power to establish bases on its territory."

Both men said they thought that the United States was motivated by other considerations that the fear of Soviet domination of Angola, though the Prime Minister said he thought it was inappropriate to discuss these motives.

Other sources here and at the recent African conference in Addis Ababa have suggested that Moscow's basic interest in Angola has been to steal a march on the Chinese, whose support of black liberation movements in southern Africa was winning them stature. In this analysis it was suggested that the United States reaction might have more to do with commitments to Peking than with African concerns. When this was put to Mr. do Nas-

cimento as a hypothesis he did not respond.

He did however ask rhetorically why, if the alleged United States interest was to counter Soviet influence, the Americans did not stay to challenge that interest.

"I would think that if one was competing for influence in a country it would be better to stay than to withdraw."

Forced to Woo Soviet

In the earlier interview, Mr. de Almeida referred to the same theme by saying that he felt United States policies "served only to close the door and push us further to the other side."

In referring to the cancellation of two 747's ordered from the Boeing Company and paid for by the Angolan Government, he said, "If we can't buy Boeings and we can't buy Douglasses, we will buy Ilyushins."

The two interviews came amid reliable reports that the Luanda forces were advancing against their rivals. There is a sense here that military priorities are giving way to projects of national and economic reconstruction.

Still the Prime Minister projected continued fighting and said he thought the United States would escalate its "aggression" despite the recent Congressional votes barring aid to Angolan factions.

He said he based this view on press reports of increased mercenary recruitment in the United States and on other reports that South Africa was reinforcing what it termed a defensive perimeter within south-

East Asia

BALTIMORE SUN
16 Jan. 1976

Vietnam spurs Seoul evolution to dictatorship

By MATTHEW J. SEIDEN
Sun Staff Correspondent

Seoul—The last year was, in the words of an opposition leader here, "a total disaster" for the already-battered Democratic Movement in South Korea.

Especially since the fall of the American-backed regimes in Indochina last spring, the powerful Park Chung Hee government has cracked down to an unprecedented extent, institutionalizing and perfecting the now virtually total suppression of all political dissent.

"The evolution of dictatorship is now complete here," one Korean said—a statement with which few objective observers could argue.

"A year ago, there was still some anti-government activity and some hope that we might force a change," another Korean said. "Now it is clear that we underestimated the ferocity of this government."

These people must remain anonymous, since an amendment to the criminal code last spring made it illegal, in effect, to criticize the government to foreigners. For "insulting, distorting, disseminating falsehoods, or other conduct which may hurt the security, interest or prestige of the Republic of Korea" a Korean can now be sentenced to up to seven years in prison.

This law was followed in May by a sweeping presidential decree banning virtually all internal dissent on threat of prison terms of up to 15 years. This edict not only made it illegal, in effect, to oppose the government, but also banned all media

reports of such opposition.

Fifty-three students and several reporters have been sentenced under this measure, and at least 150 more have been arrested, according to knowledgeable sources.

Meanwhile, the *Tung a Ilbo*, the nation's largest newspaper, gave up a nine-month fight for freedom of the press last spring, firing at least 140 independent-minded newsmen and accepting total government censorship.

The universities were brought under control by arresting student leaders, reorganizing all student activities under the direction of a government-controlled "student defense corps," making teachers responsible for the political activities of their students, and making all teachers' appointments subject to periodic review.

In addition, machine-gun bunkers were built at critical corners around campuses, and at major downtown intersections, and Seoul University, the birthplace of the student movement, was moved to an isolated, outlying suburb.

The National Assembly also was moved to an inconvenient, windswept island in the middle of the Han River, where one opposition politician complains, "We are completely cut off from the people, physically as well as politically."

Long a rubber-stamp, with one-third of its members appointed by the administration, the National Assembly grew even more feeble last year, when an opposition politician was forced to resign for criti-

cizing the government.

Kim Yeoung Sam, the head of the opposition party, also was called to the prosecutor's office, and he says his secretary has been held in solitary confinement without a trial for the last 2½ months.

Mr. Kim's enemies say he "made a deal" with the prosecutor, later repeated during a meeting with President Park himself. Mr. Kim denies this charge and says he is still "fighting to restore democracy." Nevertheless, for whatever reason, political observers say his party's fighting has grown noticeably quieter during the last year.

"We are more cautious now in fighting for democracy," Om Young Dal, an influential member of the New Democratic opposition party conceded. "Since Vietnam fell we are concerned about Korean security."

"Park says he needs five years to consolidate the country, so maybe we'll let him have those five years," the American-educated politician said. "Suppose, because of our efforts to restore democracy, there was disorder and the North Koreans took advantage of it. Then we'd lose everything."

This is basically the position taken by the Korean government, and, implicitly, by the United States officials here as well.

"The emergency measures are not designed to suppress domestic activity, but to prevent any possible insurgencies that

would help North Korean intentions," Kim Sung Jin, minister of culture and information said. "In a society like ours, the social structure is basically fragile so we need preventive measures to establish stability."

A high U.S. official agreed. "After all, this is traditionally a hierarchical, Confucian system, not equipped with the basic requirements for democracy," he said.

However, Kim Dae Chung, the former presidential candidate who was found guilty last month of election law violations basically amounting to having criticized President Park, said, "Even though our people have been forced to keep silent, they still maintain their democratic will."

Having silenced his opposition on campuses, in the anti-government Christian Movement, in the National Assembly and the media, Mr. Park ended up the year with a purge of his own henchmen.

Firing Kim Jong Pil, the prime minister who was Mr. Park's only real rival for popular support, the President filled his Cabinet with what one observer described as "obedient technicians." Those who had risen to power through politics were removed, one final bit of evidence testifying to "the death of the democratic political system in South Korea," according to one observer.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 Feb. 1976

HANOI SAYS NIXON PLEDGED 3 BILLION AS POSTWAR AID

Visiting Americans Report
Contradiction of Kissinger
on Secret Accords

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — North Vietnamese leaders recently told several visiting

members of Congress that former President Nixon sent them a memorandum early in January 1973 that they said promised \$3.25 billion in American aid after the signing of the Paris agreement to end the war in Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese did not show the visiting members of Congress the document, the Congressional sources said, but gave quotations.

According to Congressional sources, the North Vietnamese still expect the purported promise of aid to be fulfilled and are linking its fulfillment to their providing more information about American servicemen still listed as missing in

action.

Kissinger Statement

The members of Congress have been seeking a meeting with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to discuss the reported memorandum in the light of statements by Mr. Kissinger before the signing of the Paris agreement on Jan. 27, 1973. On Jan. 24, Mr. Kissinger said that the United States had made no secret understandings to obtain the agreement and that no specific sums in postwar reconstruction aid had been promised to North Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger, who was flying to the West Coast today, could not be reached immedi-

ately for comment.

Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California and one of those who met with North Vietnamese leaders, confirmed the account of the meeting and said that its substance was conveyed to President Ford this week.

The Congressional sources said that after the Congressmen visited Hanoi in late December they decided not to make these matters public. They agreed that their first step should be to consult with Administration leaders on how to respond to Hanoi's position. Mr. McCloskey and the original sources say that they have had a request to see Mr. Kissinger for several weeks.

Met With Ford

Mr. McCloskey and other members of the House of Representatives, met with Mr. Ford after their return from Hanoi and urged him to make new gestures, including certain kinds of private aid to North Vietnam, to get more response from Hanoi about Americans reported missing in action during the war. The Congressional sources said that Mr. Ford was reviewing several proposals by the State Department.

Mr. McCloskey said that North Vietnamese leaders had not specifically linked the aid and the information on the missing servicemen, but he said that "the two should go forward together."

"They told us they would give us more information as they get it, and we should make reciprocal gestures," he said.

Two articles of the Paris accords refer to the aid and information issues that the Congressmen raised in Hanoi.

Article 21 pledges the United States to "contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-

war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina."

In Article 8(B), the parties promised to help each other with information about those missing in action and with the return of remains.

The only document given the visiting members of Congress by the North Vietnamese was said to be the final agreement of the Joint Economic Committee, which was established by the Paris accords to carry out the terms of the article on post-war reconstruction.

According to the Congressional sources, the United States pledged in the document, which has never been published, to give North Vietnam \$3.25 billion in aid—the exact figure said to be in the Nixon memorandum—and broke this amount down into specific items such as tractors and bags of cement. This agreement was reached by the Joint Economic Committee in June 1974.

The American-North Vietnamese committee had its last meeting in July 1974, after the United States charged that

North Vietnam was consistently violating the terms of the Paris accords.

The State Department's position then was that the activities of the Economic Committee were dependent on general North Vietnamese compliance with the Paris accords. From that time on, the State Department made clear publicly that it would seek no funds for North Vietnam under Article 21.

In a news conference on Jan. 24, 1973, Mr. Kissinger, who was then assistant to the President, for national security, was asked about the aid pledge. He said: "We will discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all Indochina, including North Vietnam, only after the signature of the agreements, and after the implementation is well advanced, and the definition of any particular sum will have to await the discussions which will take place after the agreements are in force."

Mr. McCloskey said that he was not sure exactly what Mr. Kissinger meant by this state-

ment but that North Vietnamese leaders he talked to said that Mr. Nixon's memorandum had made a firm pledge. The Nixon memorandum was addressed to Premier Pham Van Dong, they said.

The Representatives who visited Hanoi in late December were members of the House Select Committee on Missing in Action. The others in the visiting group were G. V. Montgomery, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the committee; Richard L. Ottinger, Democrat of Westchester, and Benjamin A. Gilman, Republican of Orange County, New York.

There have been previous allegations that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger made secret arrangements with Hanoi and Saigon in order to obtain their agreement to the Paris accords. Late last year a former South Vietnamese official released a letter from Mr. Nixon to Nguyen Van Thieu, then South Vietnam's President, pledging the United States to respond "with full force" in the event of North Vietnamese violations of the accords.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 Feb. 1976

Eroding Trust

The Ford Administration's repeated scoldings of Congress about interference in executive conduct of foreign policy grow even more lame as new incidents of diplomatic dissembling become known. The latest disclosure involves a claim by Hanoi leaders that they have a secret memorandum from former President Nixon committing the United States to supply \$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

No such figure was submitted to Congress; Secretary of State Kissinger specifically declared in public statements about the time of the alleged memorandum—January, 1973—that "definition of any particular sum" would come only in subsequent discussions between Washington and Hanoi. He also stated that there were "no secret understandings" and "no secret formal obligations" in connection with the Paris truce accords of that month. Who was deceived, the American public or the leaders in Hanoi? Or have the North Vietnamese just now made up the whole Nixon memorandum?

Like the reported undercover payment of \$800,000 to a right-wing Italian general—supposedly made under Mr. Kissinger's authority while White House national security adviser—this alleged Nixon letter cannot simply be dismissed by the present Administration as a historical oddity. It is directly relevant to the degree of trust which Congress can bestow upon the executive branch in the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.

The delegation of Congressmen who visited Hanoi late in December and there learned of the reported aid commitment have been attempting ever since their return to discuss the allegations with Secretary Kissinger, to no avail. If Congress and public are to trust their responsible policymakers, those same Government officials cannot continue to duck inquiry into possible past deceptions.

Latin America

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, February 3, 1976

The Cubans: Moscow's foreign legion

By Russell Brines

The strategic significance of Moscow's new foreign legion — the Cuban ideological mercenaries — has been seriously downgraded in the global debate over Angola.

By sending an expeditionary force of over 10,000 Cubans almost openly to Angola and by supplying sophisticated weapons, Moscow demonstrated that:

- It is prepared and able to intervene, perhaps decisively, in "revolutionary" situations throughout the world which promise strategic and political profit.

- Possible American counteraction is no longer a deterrent, at least under present circumstances.

During the past few years, Moscow feverishly has built up the military capability of influencing the new global "revolutionary cycle" long predicted by Soviet propagandists. In particular, it has transformed its once-defensive fleet into an offensive seven-ocean navy with the unprecedented ability to land men on distant shores and to back them with naval airpower.

The missing ingredient in this new capability for Soviet-style "gunboat diplomacy" was a politically acceptable expeditionary force. The Soviets consistently have avoided committing their own troops outside of Europe, except for secret advisers, fliers and technicians, and therefore have largely escaped charges of "imperialism," a major political gain.

Moscow conned the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the Vietnamese into fighting — in the name of "world revolution" — what became its proxy wars against the United States. The Soviets needed fresh proxies to capitalize fully on the expanding opportunities in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Havana has responded with apparently the same enthusiasm once demonstrated by Peking.

The open use of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola constituted a major gamble — a test of Washington's response to a new phase of "world revolution." Only a few years ago, the Cubans would have risked significant retali-

ation from their powerful neighbor by meddling in a war so distant from their interests but so meaningful to vital U.S. and European supply lines.

Now, American passivity undoubtedly has strengthened the long-standing Soviet belief that the U.S. was forced into detente by its own weakness and indecision. This conclusion doubtless will result in stronger Soviet pressures on far-flung "revolutions" — a form of "ideological warfare" which Moscow specifically reserved the right to accelerate, despite detente, or because of it.

The involvement of a few thousand men capable of handling sophisticated weapons could be decisive in any of the dozens of "third world" insurrections now under way. The results in Angola already have been significant — perhaps enough to justify the expense in Soviet eyes — although the war is not over. The campaign has split the Organization of African Unity; established the acceptability of the Cubans; further divided and paralyzed the U.S.; accelerated African radicalization by drawing South African troops into action, and forced the rival Chinese to end or to decrease their support for anti-Soviet Angolan forces. Moscow obviously is seeking to split off southern Africa, to accelerate and to dominate the coming "liberation" war against South Africa from a base in Angola and to further threaten American-European sea lifelines.

The initial success of the Moscow-Havana alliance theoretically poses a global threat. It was certainly no accident that, while the OAU was splitting over Angola, the strong man of Panama, Gen. Omar Torrijos, visited Havana. There he pledged to wage a "struggle of liberation" against U.S. control over the Panama Canal, and won Premier Fidel Castro's strong and public promise of full support. This may be only bluster, but now it has new force behind it. If the Cubans can fight in Angola, they can fight in Panama, with Soviet naval support.

Mr. Brines is a free-lance writer on foreign affairs.

NEW YORK TIMES

25 Jan. 1976

Repression, Guile Keep Pinochet on Top in Chile

By HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY

CARACAS—Against the expectation of many, Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is still supreme in Chile. Twenty-eight months after a military coup overthrew the Allende administration, General Pinochet wields greater power than all but a few Presidents have had in the country's century and a half of independence.

For months, however, it has been obvious that his power is being challenged, because of the country's profound economic difficulties and because of internal and external distaste for the general's strong-arm policies that have led to charges of torture and political abuse. This has been confirmed by the decision of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, leader of the still-powerful Christian Democratic Party, to defy the ban on political activity in force since the September, 1973, coup.

The political subtlety, General Pinochet employed

In building up his personal position would have been notable in any politician. It is all the more remarkable coming from a senior member of the Chilean Army which has traditionally avoided politics, unlike say, the Argentine or the Brazilian armies.

After the coup, General Pinochet appeared on Chilean television screens as no more than the primus inter pares of the commanders of the four armed forces, the army, the navy, the air force and the carabineros, or gendarmerie, who engineered it. He spoke first and took precedence, it was explained, merely because the Army was the preponderant service, but the four services had equal rights and obligations. Since then, however, through a mixture of luck and judgment General Pinochet has come to overshadow the other three commanders and other rivals for power. Seven months after the coup, one officer who seemed to be building himself up a personal following, Gen. Oscar Bonilla, died in an accident.

A Leader Emerges

On the second anniversary of the coup, General Pinochet's political clout was formally acknowledged when he was transformed from chairman of the junta to President of the Republic and chief executive. Adm. Jose Toribio Merino of the Navy, Gen. Gustavo Leigh of the Air Force and Gen. César Mendoza of the Carabineros were given subordinate roles.

General Leigh is seen as the only member of the junta with the intellect and ambition to challenge President Pinochet. In a show of independence, General Leigh at once publicly announced he would "veto" those actions of General Pinochet of which he disapproved.

Another potential rival, within the army itself, Gen. Arellano Stark, has resigned, thus cementing the Pinochet overlordship from that direction. The overlordship is moreover guarded by the political police, which reports directly to General Pinochet.

But General Pinochet's supreme position has necessarily meant that he must accept personal responsibility for the Government's actions, domestic and international.

Here things have not been going the general's way. Economically Chile is in perilous straits. The price of copper, which provides three-quarters of all export income, shows no sign of recovery from its present low levels. Inflation, which at one time was

running at an annual rate of 900 percent, was pulled back to 340 percent last year. But even that dizzy rate was achieved only at the cost of mass unemployment, hunger and infant malnutrition which the church-run soup kitchens can do little to alleviate.

Diplomatically, Chile has suffered from the world's reaction against the abuse of human rights. This has been manifested most painfully by the decision of the United States to join most other countries in voting against Chile on a human rights question in the United Nations General Assembly in December and the action of Britain in withdrawing its Ambassador from Santiago this month after the revelations that Dr. Sheila Cassidy, a British surgeon working in Chile, had been severely tortured by the political police.

The Troubles Multiply

Within the country, General Pinochet stands dangerously isolated. The coup itself can be said to have alienated President Salvador Allende's supporters, perhaps half the population. Ex-President Frei's attack means that the Christian Democratic Party has gone from a position of tacit acceptance of the coup to outright opposition to the junta, a loss to General Pinochet of anything between a quarter and a third of the country.

Nor is it a secret that many parliamentary conservatives, whom it might be supposed would be President Pinochet's natural allies, oppose the junta's creeping totalitarianism.

General Leigh, whose political ideas seem to favor a populist brand of corporativism or Fascism as opposed to General Pinochet's elitist brand, would be the most likely replacement. He has, however, the grave disadvantage of being an airman in a land where soldiers rule.

Some observers think that General Leigh's ideas may filter through to the army, whose senior generals would ask General Pinochet to give way. On one thing, however, most people are certain. Whatever the eventual fate of General Pinochet, the road back to democracy in Chile is bound to be a slow and difficult one. No Chilean soldier relishes the thought of giving up power to civilians and then finding himself in the dock like the Greek colonels.

Hugh O'Shaughnessey is the correspondent in Latin America for the Financial Times of London.

BALTIMORE SUN

24 Jan. 1976

3d world nations get Cuban aid

Washington (AP)—Cuba, a major recipient of Soviet foreign aid, is engaged in an ambitious aid program of its own, involving more than 2,000 Cubans working in about a dozen distant lands, United States officials say.

While Moscow has been supplying Cuba with an average of \$1.5 million a day in recent years, Cuban military and civilian personnel have been at work in these countries, building schools and hospitals and offering technical assistance and political advice.

According to U.S. analysts, the chief purpose of the program is to help build up Cuba as the country the third world should look to for leadership. One official said an added reason is that the Cuban prime

minister, Fidel Castro, finds these far-flung ventures nourishing to his ego.

Hundreds of Cubans are said to be in Vietnam assisting in the war reconstruction process but most of Cuba's attentions are centered in Africa.

At the same time that the Cuban combat troops and military advisers are involved in the Angolan civil war, other Cubans are working quietly in such countries as Guinea, the Congo, Somalia, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea and Algeria, U.S. officials say. Still others serve in the Mideast country of South Yemen.

On occasion, the Cuban presence abroad is overtly military in nature, as in Angola. Until late last year, U.S. sources said, a Cuban tank battalion was based in Syria to help defend Damascus against a possible Israeli attack.

Mr. Castro told a Cuban Communist party gathering last month that the Cuban Ar-

my had "shed blood more than once in countries threatened by imperialist aggression."

The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, alluding to the deployment of Cuban soldiers far from Cuba's borders, said recently, "They seem to be everywhere but Cuba."

But officials say the majority of foreign-based Cubans, including servicemen, are on peaceful missions. Given Cuba's own economic problems, one source said, these Cubans could be put to good use at home. He added, however, that Mr. Castro has never been content to concentrate on Cuba alone.

For years, Mr. Castro had hoped to spark political upheavals in Latin America by aiding guerrilla groups. But U.S. analysts say evidence indicates Mr. Castro has yielded to Moscow's wishes and abandoned this tactic.

In turning his attention to Africa, Mr. Castro has cited the racial affinity between many

Cubans and black Africans.

The blood of Africa, he said last month, "runs abundantly through our veins."